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AGENCY SELF-INSULATION UNDER
PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW
Jennifer Nou*
Agencies possess enormous regulatory discretion. This discretion allows executive
branch agencies in particular to insulate their decisions from presidential review by
raising the costs of such review. They can do so, for example, through variations in
policymaking form, cost-benefit analysis quality, timing strategies, and institutional
coalition-building. This Article seeks to help shift the literature's focus on courtcentered agency behavior to consider instead the role of the President under current
executive orders. Specifically, the Article marshals public-choice insights to offer an
analytic framework for what it calls agency self-insulation under presidential review,
illustrates the phenomenon, and assesses some normative implications. The framework
generates several empirically testable hypotheses regarding how presidential transitions
and policy shifts will influence agency behavior. It also challenges the doctrinalfocus on
removal restrictions and highlights instead a more functional understanding of agency
independence. Finally, these dynamics suggest a role for courts to help enforce
separation of powers principles within the executive branch and also, along with
Congress, to facilitate political monitoring by encouraging information from sources
external to the presidential review process.

INTRODUCTION

judges facing appellate review,
like trial
dministrative
dislike
having agencies,
their decisions
reversed. Reversals are costly. They
can upend months, usually years, of work spent gathering data, reaching out to stakeholders, and considering and responding to public
comments.' This is to say nothing of the efforts required to draft regulatory text, analyses, and preambles with the sustained coordination of
policy experts, economists, scientists, and lawyers through multiple
stages of the rulemaking process.2 Moreover, reversals create more

A

* Public Law Fellow, University of Chicago Law School; former policy analyst and special
assistant to the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. The views
expressed are the author's own and based only on public documents. For helpful comments
on earlier drafts, thanks to Bruce Ackerman, Ryan Bubb, Richard Epstein, William Eskridge,
David Fontana, Tom Ginsburg, Aziz Huq, Alex Lee, Michael Levin, Jerry Mashaw, Jonathan
Masur, Tom Miles, Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Connor Raso, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Matthew
Stephenson, Jed Stiglitz, Cass Sunstein, and Stuart Shapiro. Thanks also to workshop participants at the University of Chicago, Duke, George Washington, Harvard, New York University,
Northwestern, University of Pennsylvania, and Yale.
I See Stuart Shapiro, Presidents and Process:A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under
the Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations, 23 J.L. & POL. 393, 416 (2007) (reporting an average
of 813 days between agenda publication and finalization for Bush Administration rules and 844
days for Clinton Administration rules during corresponding time periods).
2 See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032, 1036-41 (2oll) (describing the complicated dynamics among internal agency actors).
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work for agencies by sending them back to the drawing board in settings where resources are already constrained and budgets consistently
threatened. Reversals also thwart the policy preferences of the agency.
That agencies may act strategically to avoid costly reversals, then,
is hardly a surprise, nor is it a novel insight. For the most part, however, scholars have explored this premise with respect to the anticipated effects of judicial review.3 From this outlook, an agency facing the
prospect of litigation will behave in order to minimize the risk of judicial reversals. A rational agency, that is, will select its interpretive and
policy choices efficiently, taking into account the court's expected reaction. 4 For example, many noted that after United States v. Mead
Corp.5 an agency could expect to qualify for greater deference through
more elaborate proceedings. 6 Some thus expected to see agencies engage in more notice-and-comment rulemaking relative to less formal
mechanisms after Mead, and have found tentative empirical support
for this hypothesis.' As the potential for costly judicial reversals increased, so did concerns about regulatory "ossification."
What this perspective overlooks, however, is the fact that the vast
majority of rulemaking agencies - the executive branch agencies 3 See generally, e.g., Yehonatan Givati, Strategic Statutory Interpretation by Administrative
Agencies, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 95 (2010); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1437-42 (2004); Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2013); Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect: Textual
Plausibility,ProceduralFormality, and JudicialReview of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120
HARV. L. REV. 528 (2oo6); Emerson H. Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling Process:Judicial
Influence on Regulatory Decision Making, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. I 14 (1998); Emerson H. Tiller &
Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments: Legal Structure and Political Games in Administrative
Law, 1s J.L. EcON. & ORG. 349 (1999); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions: The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 SUP. CT. REV. 53, 74-75; sources cited infra note 4.
4 These accounts largely predict that agency behavior, and litigation incentives more generally, will shift under "hard look" review in ways that are sensitive to reviewing judges' nominating
parties. See, e.g., Brandice Canes-Wrone, Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the
Lower Courts, 47 AM. J. POL. ScI. 205, 2 10 (2003); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Essay,
Judicial Partisanshipand Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the FederalCourts of
Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175 (1998); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of
ArbitrarinessReview, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 813-14 (2008); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental

Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit,83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1735 (1997).

533 U.S. 218 (2001).
See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 3, at 532; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27 ("We hold that
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying
the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the
exercise of that authority. Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by
an agency's power to engage in adjudication or n.Qtice-and-comment rulemaking.").
7 See, e.g., Anne Joseph O'Connell, PoliticalCycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portraitof
the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 932-33 (2oo8).
8 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAw, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 164-65 (997); Thomas
0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1419
6

(1992).
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face not only the courts' review of their decisions, but also review by
the President. The lopsided attention to judicial review in the literature is thus puzzling for multiple reasons. First, presidential review is
more systematic than judicial review. Judicial review of an agency action is available only when a litigating party with standing and the
necessary resources brings suit.9 Not only must that party demonstrate that she has come to court at the right time (that is, when the issue is ripe, based on a final agency action, and administratively exhausted),10 but also that review is neither precluded by statute nor
committed to the agency's discretion." Presidential review of rulemaking, by contrast, encompasses all "significant" regulatory actions,
which agencies are required to submit directly for review.12
Second, even when a party does bring suit, courts are often selfconsciously deferential to an agency's interpretive and policy decisions.13 Presidential review, however, operates under weaker principles of self-restraint. Presidential review is also broader in coverage
than judicial review. More rules are reviewed by the executive branch
than by the courts - or by the legislature, for that matter. 4 How
many and which rules count as "significant" enough for presidential
review varies, but in recent years the number has hovered between
9 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2oo6) ("A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled
to judicial review thereof."); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)
(holding that parties failed to demonstrate circumscribed standing requirements). Regarding litigation resources, see Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings: An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1746-47 (2012).

10 See 5 U.S.C. § 704; see also, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967);
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938); Reliable Automatic Sprinkler
Co. v. CPSC, 324 F.3 d 726, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
" See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).

12 See Exec. Order No. 12,866

§ 6(a)( 3 )(B),

3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5

U.S.C. § 6o app. at 86-91 (2006 & Supp. V 201).

13 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) ("The
responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between
competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones . . . ."); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (emphasizing that, despite hard look, the
"scope of review under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency").
14 Congress, after passing a statute delegating discretion to an administrative agency, can of
course always override an agency rule by amending the statute. Otherwise, Congress's main opportunity to review an agency's rule currently arises under the 1996 Congressional Review Act, 5
U.S.C. §§ 8oi-8o8 (2oo6). That Act, among other things, requires agencies to send a copy of every new final rule and its associated analysis to Congress and the Government Accountability Office. Id. § 8o(a)(i)(A}-(B). Within a sixty-day review period, Congress can use expedited procedures to pass a joint resolution of disapproval overturning the rule. Id. § 8o1(a)(3)(B). To date,
however, the statute has been used only once to invalidate a rule. That rule was the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration's ergonomics standard in March 2oo, "an action that some
believe to be unique to the circumstances of its passage." MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30116, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING 6 (2oo8).
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about 500 and 700 per year.'5 Only a small fraction of these, however,
are litigated and reviewed in court.' 6 Even if one argues that the
threat of judicial review alone is sufficient to shift agency behavior,
the prospect of such review is still attenuated relative to presidential
review.
Finally, presidential review precedes even the possibility of judicial
oversight for many executive branch regulatory actions. Such review
covers agency actions much earlier in the rulemaking process, not only
proposed and final rules as the literature commonly (but incorrectly)
claims," but also more preliminary notices of inquiry, requests for information, and advance notices of proposed rulemaking.' 8 Doctrines
such as ripeness and finality, however, preclude judicial review of such
actions.' 9 The failure to decompose the effects of this sequential review process - presidential, then judicial - may cloud existing empirical efforts to consider the impacts of court oversight.
The relative lack of attention to agency incentives when faced with
presidential review, in short, has resulted in an ultimately incomplete
account of agency behavior. Extant work has focused on discrete but
related issues such as the institutional role of cost-benefit analysis, 20
15 See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 3 2 3 97, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: THE ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 2 (2009);
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-929, RULEMAKING: OMB's ROLE IN REVIEWS
OF AGENCIES' DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 3-4 (2003)
[hereinafter GAO, REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items
/d0392 9 .pdf.
16 For example, from 1988 to 1990 only thirteen of the twenty-eight significant hazardous

waste rules from the Environmental Protection Agency were challenged and reviewed in court.
See Cary Coglianese, Litigating Within Relationships: Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory Process, 30 L. & SOC'Y REV. 735, 742 (1996). Of the Agency's more than ninety hazardous air
pollutant rules, only seven have been litigated to judgment, leaving more than eighty-three to escape judicial decision. See Wagner, supra note 9, at 1740.
17 See, e.g., Michael Hissam, Essay, The Impact of Executive Order 13,422 on PresidentialOversight of Agency Administration, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1292, 1295 (2008) (describing Clinton's
executive order as requiring "cabinet departments and agencies to submit proposed and final rules
to the OMB before publication in the FederalRegister"(emphasis added)).
18 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 6os app. at 86-91 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
19 See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Comm'r, FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 33-34 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (holding that ripeness and finality doctrines precluded review of FDA advance notice of
proposed rulemaking regulation because, among other things, the proposal had yet "to pass under
the censorial eye of OMB, whose review might well have prompted revision," id. at 34).
20 See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutionsfor
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, Io U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1367-70 (2002) (discussing how an
administrative process using cost-benefit analysis can serve as an "[i]nformation [r]evelation

[d]evice," id. at 1367); Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive
Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137 (2001); see also Michael A. Livermore, CostBenefit Analysis and Agency Independence 7-9 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library) (arguing that agencies can use cost-benefit analysis methodology as a means
of resisting presidential review).
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the effects of political transitions more broadly,2' and agency attempts
to avoid the review process altogether. 22 Positive political theorists
have long considered the strategic interactions between political actors
and the bureaucracy, but their models of political control are often
Congress-centric, frequently leaving the President to appear simply "as
a strategic legislative actor, whose influence over the bureaucracy pales
beside that of Congress." 23 Renewed efforts to consider agencies as
strategic actors in their own right are still nascent 24 and continue to
lack a contextual examination of incentives during the presidential review process as currently conceived and actually practiced. 2 5
This Article seeks to help further shift the focus from the judiciary
to the executive branch by offering such an analysis, illustrating its
applications, and assessing its normative implications. Specifically, the
discussion draws upon public choice premises grounded in the
straightforward notion that agencies can choose from different regulatory instruments, each of which will impose varying costs on the executive branch to review and reverse. Increasing review costs will effectively insulate various decisions contained within a rule or across a
number of rules, since the President will have to spend his limited resources more selectively, reviewing and reversing fewer decisions.
These agency self-insulation instruments include the means through
21 See Anne Joseph O'Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political ransitions, 1o Nw. U. L.
REV. 471, 477-78 (2011); O'Connell, supra note 7.
22 See Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994 (2011).
23 Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 19, 38 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph
O'Connell eds., 2010); see also Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in
PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 455, 473 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) ("[P]ositive theorists
have emphasized the courts' role as backstoppers of Congress .... Presidents, who spell trouble
for Congress, have been explored less seriously.. .. [T]heir control is either downplayed or viewed
as unwarranted.").
24 See, e.g., GREGORY A. HUBER, THE CRAFT OF BUREAUCRATIC NEUTRALITY 14
(2007); Alex Acs & Charles Cameron, Regulatory Auditing at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (Sept. 13, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School
Library); O'Connell, supra note 21, at 482-87; O'Connell, supra note 7, at 916-22; Note, supra
note 22. Acs and Cameron model the relationship between OIRA and agencies as an auditing
game, where the agencies choose among inaction, a "small" regulation, and an "economically significant" regulation. Acs & Cameron, supra, at 9. Their main task, however, is to analyze OIRA's
actual targeting decisions, not the incentive effects on the agencies (this Article's focus). For an
older work in this Article's tradition, see WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 24-30 (1971), which posits agency behavior in terms of budget

maximization. But see Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-BuildingGovernment in ConstitutionalLaw, 118
HARV. L. REV. 915, 932-34 (2005) (questioning Niskanen's model of bureaucratic behavior).
25 See Robert F. Durant & William G. Resh, PresidentialAgendas, Administrative Strategies,
and the Bureaucracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 577,
582 (George C. Edwards m & William G. Howell eds., 2009) (after surveying relevant political
science literature, noting that "there is still a great deal we do not know and that merits future
research," including the need for "contextual analyses to improve our understanding of how agencies react strategically to White House centralization efforts").

2013]

AGENCY SELF-INSULATION

1761

which agencies can bypass review or raise the political and resource
costs during the review itself. The incentive to engage in strategic behavior, in turn, increases the more an agency expects the President to
disagree with and thus reverse it.26 At the same time, decreases in relative resources can also have self-insulating effects. Because agencies
are repeat players whose self-insulation attempts earn the President's
ire, the agency will selectively deploy the strategy only when it finds it
the most valuable.
The full story is, of course, a more subtle one. Presidential review
has many benefits that may reduce the incentive to self-insulate, and
informal communication avenues preceding formal review may render
the prospect of self-insulation infeasible. Self-insulation may thus be
most prevalent for the broad set of regulatory actions that are not clearly
salient or high profile; actions that are already high profile are likely to
come to the attention of the White House through other means.2 7 And
no doubt, other exogenous actors and oversight mechanisms - most
notably from Congress - can cut against and complicate these dynamics, some of which will be briefly discussed. The narrow focus
here, however, will be on the relationship between executive branch
agencies and the President under formal regulatory review, holding all
other factors constant; in this sense, the Article presents a partial equilibrium analysis. One aim is to isolate a robust set of dynamics that
can generate compelling (but falsifiable) hypotheses, with a view toward helping to explain potentially systematic behavioral variation.
Exploring these intraexecutive branch dynamics is valuable in part
because they temper two traditional tenets of presidential control.
First, the most robust accounts of a "unitary" executive celebrate a vision of executive power that is vested in "one, and only one, person,"
emphasizing the accountability-enhancing features of that singular figurehead.28 The scope of this vision must be qualified, however, by the
reality that Presidents delegate regulatory review to a number of
agents, mostly within the Executive Office of the President, who themselves disagree and conflict over what the President desires. Accountability diminishes when these actors publicly blame each other for un26 The incentive likely persists even when the agency is simply uncertain about those preferences but wants to avoid the potential review costs.
27 See infra section HC, pp. 1811-13; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1848-50 (2013) (discussing informal channels through which OIRA and the White House can be alerted to upcoming rules).
The most high-profile rules are more likely to come to the attention of the White House through
informal means and external fire-alarm oversight, and may also gain the most benefits from review in terms of information, expertise, and political support.
28 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 3 (2008);
see also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The Presidentand the Administration, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. I, 2-3 (1994).
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popular policies from which the President seeks distance. 29 In other
words, the more the institutional presidency is perceived as a "they"
and not an "it," the more diffuse the blame. 3 0 As such, while this Article speaks of review by the "President" and "presidential review," the
terms are but shorthand for the more complex dynamics of the coordinated, interagency review process within the executive branch; they refer to review by the President not as an individual, but as an institution.
Second, also at stake in these debates is the ability of the President
to sanction defiant agency heads. A look through the U.S. case reporters would suggest that, at least as a doctrinal matter, the hallmark of
such control lies in the President's removal power. Recently, in Free
Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board,35 for example, the 5-4 majority struck down a "dual for-cause" provision of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Congress could not create an entity, the heads
of which enjoyed for-cause tenure protections, within another agency,
the heads of which were similarly protected. 3 2 The second layer of
removal restrictions unconstitutionally blurred the lines of executive
responsibility. By contrast, Justice Breyer's dissent privileged function
over form.33 In his view, the independence of an agency depends on a
number of factors, including its separate budgeting and litigating authority and, "above all, a political environment, reflecting tradition and
function, that would impose a heavy political cost" upon a President
seeking to remove without cause. 34 Independence is a matter of degree
that cannot be determined by removal restrictions alone, but rather
requires a careful assessment of the likely presidential calculations
within particular contexts.
One way to understand the majority and dissent's disagreement is
as an empirical one about the actual determinants of successful agency
resistance to the President: do removal restrictions trump the myriad
other factors that could determine relative bargaining power?3 s If not,
See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, White House and the FD.A. Often at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,
at Ai (describing various policy conflicts involving, among others, the Deputy Chief of
Staff, the FDA Commissioner, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the OIRA
Administrator).
30 See JOHN P. BURKE, THE INSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY 2 7-52 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing
institutional features of the presidency); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside
the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of PresidentialControl, 1os MICH. L.
REV. 47, 49 (2oo6) ("Presidential control is a 'they,' not an 'it."'); Sunstein, supra note 27, at I840
("[Wl]hile the President is ultimately in charge, the White House itself is a 'they,' not an 'it."').
29

2012,

31

530 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).

32 Id. at 3151.
33 See id. at 3169,

3183 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3183.
3s See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18 (20I0) (listing a number of potential "equalizing factors" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agen34
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then courts need other tools and more systematic ways to think about
the concept. By focusing on a subset of agencies without the traditional
hallmarks of independence - the executive branch agencies - this
analysis provides one such lens, trained on the ways in which agencies
can resist institutionalized forms of presidential influence amidst resource constraints. In addition, it also highlights another locus of independence in the more stable federal bureaucracy: the career civil
servants within agencies who may bear many of the potential reversal
costs and thus possess significant incentives to avoid them. As such,
this discussion hopes to combine insights from studies that attempt to
understand how agency officials "assess presidential control" and "how
it affect[s] their decision-making processes," 36 along with more topdown analyses of White House control37 and more recent efforts to
clarify the nature of the presidential review process. 38 This investigation also seeks to engage the literature on cost-benefit analysis not only
as a set of numbers such as net benefits, but also as a practice - the
ways that agencies, for example, present costs and benefits, and why.39
Moreover, this Article will argue that indicia of agency selfinsulation can serve as signals of agency resistance to presidential control, the normative desirability of which depends on the nature of the
underlying statutory scheme at issue. Under statutes that narrowly
constrain policy discretion, self-insulation should be viewed as more
likely to be salutary attempts to protect against undue politicization;
thus, in these circumstances, courts should be more willing to uphold
such efforts under either Chevron's second step 40 or hard look review.
By contrast, when statutes authorize broad policy judgments and call
for discretionary interest-balancing, then courts should view selfinsulation more warily as efforts that evade democratic accountability.
Finally, both courts and Congress should facilitate political monitoring
cies (and Executive Agencies), CORNELL L. REV (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 5-6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=2125194 (surveying independent and
executive agencies for a "broad set of indicia of independence," id. (manuscript at 6), and finding
no single common feature); Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the
Laws, io6 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 295 (2006) ("[W]ho is granted express authority under the statute
likely influences the relative bargaining positions of the agency and the President."); Adrian
Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript
at 1-2), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=21O33 38 (arguing that
agency independence can be explained by reference to conventions).
36 Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 62.

37 See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investigation, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 873-76 (2003); Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2284-90 (2001).

38

See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 27.
39 See generally MATTHEw D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS (2oo6); Conference, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Legal, Economic, and Philosophical Perspectives, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 837 (2000).
40 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1983).
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when strategic behavior or resource constraints have reduced the quality of information about a regulatory action's consequences.
Part I introduces an analytic framework focusing on the potential
for principal-agent divergence between the President and agencies as
well as the resulting decision and reviewing costs. Part II further develops this approach by examining the various regulatory instruments
available to a self-insulating agency and the incentives to choose
among them. Specifically, these instruments can functionally serve to
bypass review, calibrate its scrutiny, or truncate the amount of time
available - all of which can be augmented by successful coalitionbuilding attempts. Part III, in turn, examines various responses available to the executive branch, such as directives, spot checks, and timing
strategies, as well as the potential implications of agency self-insulation
for Congress and the courts.
I. FACING PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW

A. Strategic Agencies
One of administrative law's anxieties is the problem of authority
delegated from more politically accountable actors to the unelected
ones within administrative agencies. Concerns that Congress, resigned
only to "fire-alarm" oversight by interest groups and stymied by collective action problems, has effectively abdicated the monitoring of its initial delegations of power only heighten these worries. 4 1 If congressional ex post oversight is sporadic and ad hoc, some have argued that
political actors could nevertheless control bureaucratic discretion by
carefully designing the ex ante structures and processes through which
agencies determine policy outcomes. 42 One basic premise of these accounts is that procedures can help promote desired outcomes by, for
example, stacking the deck towards preferred interest groups, 43 specifying the timing of agency decisions," or otherwise constraining agency discretion.

41 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
42 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process,
Politics and Policy:Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L.
REV. 431, 433-34 (1989).
43 See David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and
Agency Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 699 (1994); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll &
Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Proceduresas Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. EcON.
& ORG. 243, 261 (1987); see also Jonathan R. Macey, OrganizationalDesign and the PoliticalControl of AdministrativeAgencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 99-101 (1992).
44 See generally Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121

HARV L. REV. 543 (2007).
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I. The Limits of Ex Ante Controls. - With much of the attention
on the relationship between Congress and agencies, however, Presidents were, "for all intents and purposes, left out 45 of many scholarly
analyses, primarily characterized as part of the enacting coalition,46 or
else notable only for their indirect influence on legislative calculations,
perhaps through later appointments4 7 or veto threats. 4 8 In response,
some have sought to bring the President firmly back into the picture as
a discrete and autonomous actor with his own institutional objectives
and mechanisms of control. 4 9 In this view, sitting atop the institutions
that execute and project his power, the President must delegate tasks
to his own agents and ensure their fidelity. These control mechanisms
include efforts to politicize the bureaucracy through appointments,
along with the related authority to remove insubordinates.5 0
A growing literature, however, has documented some of the pragmatic realities that blunt the impact of both of these strategies. Appointments can often arise from patronage motivations as opposed to
close ideological alignment,5 1 or can prove less than effective due to
the relative institutional inexperience of the appointees5 2 or countervailing legislative pressures.53 Similarly, while the power of the President to remove an agency head at will no doubt bears on the scope of
his influence, some have questioned its actual utility and detailed the
obstacles to its use. 5 4 Namely, removals can exact high political costs,
45 DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 14 (2003).
46 See, e.g., MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
9(1995).

47 Id. at 9-io. See also Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 43, at 698.
48 See John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L.
ECON & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) I, 12-17 (1990).
49 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at I, Q3-15.
50 Political scientists have observed that the percentage of presidential appointees as a share of

the federal workforce has more than doubled since mid-century, peaking in 1980 and increasing
during unified governments. See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 98 fig-4.2, 202-05 (2oo8); David E. Lewis, PresidentialAppointments and Personnel, 14 ANN. REV. POL. SC. 47, 49-50 (2011). Evidence also suggests that efforts to politicize
appointments increase when policy disagreement between the President and agencies is expected
to be largest, for example when comparing efforts after a party change in the next President
against situations without such changes. LEWIS, supra, at 89.
51 See Joshua D. Clinton et al., Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies, Presidents,and Congress, 56 AM. J. POL. SC. 341, 346, 352 (2012).
52 See LEWIS, supra note So, at 174-89.
s3 See Nolan McCarty, The Appointments Dilemma, 48 AM.J. POL. SCI. 413, 413-14 (2004).
54 See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 461, 480-82 (2010); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive from Those
Who Would Distort and Abuse It: A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresiand
Christopher S. Yoo, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 607 (2010) (describing numerous examples of
when "legal obstacles to the use of the President's removal power [welre insignificant in their effects," while the "political obstacles [welre often formidable").
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especially when they defy norms or conventions about the removed
party's perceived need for independence.55 In light of these limitations, the social science literature has taken a more functional approach to presidential control, as "the degree of actual or effective control exerted over the agency. 5 6 These accounts have identified other
avenues of presidential influence, such as through budgetary decisions
coordinated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),57 input
in agency legislative programs,5 8 and the relative location of the agency within the cabinet hierarchy.5 9
While these structures and processes are important ex ante mechanisms of control, they still allow for significant agency slack and discretion over individual rules and regulatory decisions. As a result,
numerous Presidents have opted for more institutionalized and systematic mechanisms of ex post oversight through regulatory review. 6 0
These agency-cost-reducing procedures are categorically different from
ex ante control mechanisms in that they allow the President to evaluate and more surgically influence discrete administrative outputs rather
than inputs. While appointments and budgeting, for instance, can
help steer the general direction of regulatory policy, review procedures
by their very nature allow the President to reassess the individual outcomes of these efforts after the fact and to react under potentially
changed circumstances. 61 That is, they allow for more dynamic and
responsive presidential influence. 62
In this manner, presidential review can, like appellate court review,
be understood as part of a class of institutional mechanisms that in5s See Pierce, supra note 54, at 607; Vermeule, supranote 35.
56 Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE
AND PUBLIC LAW, supra note 23, at 333, 347.
s7 See SHELLEY LYNNE TOMKIN, INSIDE OMB 117-2 16 (1998); Christopher R. Berry et al.,
The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 783, 792-94
(2010) (finding evidence that districts and counties receive more federal outlays when representatives are in the President's party).
5s See ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, MANAGING THE PRESIDENT'S PROGRAM 5-8 (2002).
59 LEWIS, supra note 45, at 44-45.
60 See Alan E. Wiseman, Delegation and Positive-Sum Bureaucracies, 71 J. POL. 998, 999-ooo
(2009).

61 See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 97 (2008) ("[W]hereas
the president lacks the ability to veto selective pieces of legislation, he enjoys a 'line-item veto,' so
to speak, of agencies' regulatory initiatives."). Of course, over time, one could also understand
personnel and funding efforts as ways of disciplining an agency based on a broad review of its
policies or particularly salient ones, but these mechanisms are too blunt and static for this purpose
and thus better understood as prospective, rather than retrospective, tools. See, e.g., Daniel F.
Spulber & David Besanko, Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate, 8 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 126, 127 (1992) ("The appointment of the agency director and senior staff guides the future direction of the agency.").
62 See William F. West, The Institutionalizationof Regulatory Review: OrganizationalStability and Responsive Competence at OIRA, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 76, 78 (2005).
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volve more flexible and situation-specific monitoring by principals relative to the enforcement of rigid ex ante rules.63 As regulatory review
becomes increasingly institutionalized through promulgated procedures
and standards, it also becomes more predictable relative to more ad
hoc methods of ex post monitoring. The process is thus more likely to
give rise to sustained patterns of strategic behavior on the part of covered actors the longer these procedures are in place.
2. PresidentialReview. The current structure of presidential review has, for the most part, persisted for almost twenty years, since
1993 when President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866.64 While
these governing procedures are the focus of this Article, some brief historical context may be useful. Presidential oversight efforts date back
centuries, 65 though President Reagan was arguably the first to exert
more supervisory control "self-consciously and openly" 66 when he issued Executive Order 12,291 in 1981.67 Among other things, the order
required executive agencies to submit proposed and final rules to the
OMB, 68 a role delegated thereafter to the then-newly established Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). 6 9 For a subset of
these rules, those deemed "major," 0 agencies also had to submit a regulatory impact analysis: the agency's description of the rule's antici-

63 See Jeffrey S. Banks, Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI.
670 (1989); Matthew C. Stephenson, InformationAcquisition and InstitutionalDesign, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 1422, 1454 (2oll) (categorizing both appellate review and executive review of rulemaking
as examples of "settings [where] the principal can only establish forms of review in which the
overseer makes whatever decision is optimal ex post, rather than enforcing a set of rules that
would be optimal ex ante").
64 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 6os
app. at 86-91 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
65 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: FederalistFoundations, 1787-18o,

115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1304-o6 (2006) (describing various examples, for instance,

that "[President] Washington imposed his will through a consistent style of broad consultation,
independent judgment, and continuous oversight," id. at 1304); Kagan, supra note 37, at 2272-77.
66
67
68
69

Kagan, supra note 37, at 2277.
See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) (revoked
1993).
See id. § 3(c), 3 C.F.R. at 128-29.
Created under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812

(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 20, 30, 42, and 44 U.S.C.), OIRA is located within
the Executive Office of the President (EOP) and, specifically, OMB. See 44 U.S.C. § 3503 (2006);
see also GAO, REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note I5, at 17-18.
70 Specifically, section i(b) of the order defined a major rule as "any regulation that is likely to

result in: (i) [a]n annual effect on the economy of $ioo million or more; (2) [a] major increase in
costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local government agencies,
or geographic regions; or (3) [s]ignificant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment,
productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in domestic or export markets." Exec. Order No. 12,291 § i(b), 3 C.F.R. at
127-28.

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

1768

[VOL.

126:1755

pated costs and benefits, net benefits, and the potential alternatives
considered. 7 1
These innovations were reinforced four years later when President
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,498, which allowed OMB to exert
its influence earlier in the regulatory process in conjunction with agencies' political appointees.7 2 The order required executive agencies to
submit a "regulatory program" for review each year that covered all of
their significant regulatory actions underway or planned.73 The President now had an opportunity to influence the regulatory process during its planning, proposal, and final stages.
While George H.W. Bush's Administration kept the Reagan executive orders in place, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866
74
in 1993, which contained several noteworthy changes relevant here.
First, unlike the previous regime that reviewed all regulations, executive branch agencies now only had to submit those rules that were the
most "significant," demarcating a reduced scope of review. 7 5 The effort was an attempt to make the process more selective "so as to focus
resources on the most important" rules.76
Second, for those rules that were "economically significant," agencies were required to provide an especially thorough regulatory impact
analysis.77 This requirement effectively heightened the scrutiny of review as well as the amount of information available for it. Third,
since agencies and other commentators had accused OIRA of unduly
delaying regulations, the order now established a presumptive timeta71 Id.

§ 3 (c)d), 3

C.F.R. at 128-29.

72 See Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986) (revoked 1993); James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review by the Executive Office of the President: An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L.J. 851, 867 (2001).
73 Exec. Order No. 12,498 § 1, 3 C.F.R. at 323.

74 Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted as amended in

5 U.S.C. § 6oi

app. at

86-91 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).

15 Id. § (6)(a)(3)(A), 3 C.F.R. at 645. Subsection 3 (b), with minor exceptions, covers all agencies
except those "considered to be independent regulatory agencies" as defined by 44 U.S.C.
§ 3502(io), a provision of the Paperwork Reduction Act. Id. § 3 (b), 3 C.F.R. at 641; see Arthur
Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the Economic Analysis of Regulations at Independent Regulatory
Commissions, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 213, 214-15 (2011); cf Exec. Order No.
12,866 §4(b)-(c), 3 C.F.R. at 642-43 (requiring independent regulatory agencies to submit Regulatory Agendas and Plans).
76 Kagan, supra note 37, at 2287; see also Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and Recommendations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 103, l05 (2011) (noting that the process
was "more selective").
77 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. at 645-46. CircularA-4, in turn, states
that "Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to conduct a regulatory analysis for economically
significant regulatory actions as defined by subsection 3 (f)(i)." See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A- 4 , REGULATORY ANALYSIS I (2003) [hereinafter OMB, CIRCULAR A- 4 ],
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/circulars/aoo4/a-4.pdf;
Sunstein, supra note 27, at 185 (describing "Regulatory Impact Analysis" as "a careful and detailed account of the costs and benefits of economically significant rules").
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ble: it expected review to be complete within ninety days, but allowed
the OMB Director to extend that period for another thirty days at the
request of the agency.78 Fourth, the order contained a number of
dispute-resolution provisions for "disagreements or conflicts between
or among agency heads or between OMB and any agency that [could
not] be resolved by the [OIRA Administrator]." 9 Specifically, such
disputes were to be resolved by the President or the Vice President acting at the President's request.80
Finally, the order specified general standards of review. Namely, it
called for consistency with the "President's priorities," the prevention
of "conflict with the policies or actions taken or planned by another
agency," as well as adherence to the "principles set forth in this Executive order."8 ' One of the most important principles was that the "benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs," 82 while another demanded the "best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, economic,
and other information" regarding regulatory consequences.83 In this
manner, the order distinguished between what might be called political
review (those issues raised as part of the President's agenda and priorities) and analytical review (how agencies evaluate the costs and benefits of regulatory options, justify the choices among them, and consider
a host of other technical issues).84
As an indication of just how entrenched these procedures had become, President George W. Bush left Clinton's executive order virtually unmodified for most of his Administration. In 2002, however, he issued an order that transferred various vice presidential functions to
the White House Chief of Staff or OMB Director, but otherwise left

78 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(2)(B)-(C), 3 C.ER. at 647. Review of "notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, or other preliminary regulatory actions prior to a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking" were to be completed "within io working days" of submission. Id.
§ 6(b)(2)(A), 3 C.F.R. at 646.
79 Id. § 7, 3 C.F.R. at 648.
80 Id.

81 Id. § 2(b), 3 C.F.R. at 640.
82 Id. § i(b)(6), 3 C.F.R. at 639. An agency determining whether a regulation's benefits "justify" its costs could consider both "quantifiable" as well as "qualitative" costs and benefits, factors
that were "difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider." Id. § i(a), 3 C.ER. at 639.
83 Id. § i(b)(7), 3 C.F.R. at 639.
84 See Stuart Shapiro, Unequal Partners:Cost-Benefit Analysis and Executive Review ofRegulations, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,433, 10,433-34 (2005) (distinguishing between "OIRA's role as the

eyes and ears of the president in overseeing regulatory agencies" and its "analytical mission," id. at
10,434). On the one hand, "the review process will ask how and if the rule fits with the law and
with presidential commitments, goals, and priorities." Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1869. On the
other hand, it will also concern issues such as the "accuracy" of costs and benefits, the "avoiding
unjustified costs," id., as well as (i) alternatives; (2) the need to seek public comments; (3) logical
outgrowth issues; (4) the need for interim final rules; (5) statutory process requirements; and (6)
scientific issues, id. at 1869-71.
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the previous text unchanged. 5 It was not until January 2007, about
thirteen years after President Clinton's intervention, that President
Bush imposed more substantive amendments. 6 However, on January
30, 2009, President Obama withdrew the Bush amendments and returned to the original and unamended Clinton executive order. 7 In
January 2011, he issued Executive Order 13,563, which among other
things "reaffirm[ed] the principles, structures, and definitions govern8 and modernized many of its
ing contemporary regulatory review"*
89
provisions.
As such, with the exception of about two years under
President George W. Bush, the formal procedures first established under President Clinton in 1993 continue to operate today.9 0
B. Resource-Centered Insulation
Given the prospect of presidential review as practiced in its current
form for almost two decades, it is reasonable to expect that executive
branch agencies, and especially the career staff within them, have
learned to manage and adapt to the process in accordance with their
own aims. Administrative agencies are bureaucracies as traditionally
conceived, and such bureaucracies have long been known to create
routines and strategies for dealing with new requirements imposed upon them.9 1 As such, it is fruitful to think about agencies' behaviors
relative to the President's in terms of their respective resource constraints, and the differential costs and payoffs faced by the actors that
initiate review (like agencies) and the actors that review them (like the
institutional President). These concepts, originally developed by Pro85 Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2003) (revoked 2009).

86 Among the most important, the amendments required agencies to identify "market failure[s]" in writing, specified that Regulatory Policy Officers within agencies had to be political appointees who served as gatekeepers for new rulemakings, and finally, explicitly extended regulatory review to guidance documents. Exec. Order No. 13,422 §§ i(a), 5(b), 7, 3 C.F.R. 191, 191-93
(2008) (revoked 2009). For a prediction that the "ultimate impact of the Bush amendments"
would be "largely symbolic," see Cary Coglianese, The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform,
25 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 85 (2oo8).
87 See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 6oi
app. at loo-ol (2006 & Supp. V 2011).

88 Exec. Order No. 13,563 § i(b), 3 C.F.R. 215, 215 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 6oi app. at 102-02.
89 See id. §§ 2-6, 3 C.F.R. at 216-17; see also Exec. Order No. 13,579 § i(b)-(c), 3 C.F.R. 256,
257 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 6o app. at 102 (providing that independent agencies "should" similarly "promote" and "comply with" many of the general principles).
90 See generally Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62
U. CHI. L. REV. I, 16-28 (1995) (describing the procedural innovations introduced by President
Clinton).
91 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 221-32 (1989) (discussing how bureaucracies
adapt to innovations); see generally CORNELL G. HOOTON, EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE 5

(1997) (examining the "patterns of attention and concern among career officials and on the organizational factors that shape the ability of departmental bureaus to adopt new activities").
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fessors Emerson Tiller and Pablo Spiller for the purposes of understanding agency interaction with judicial review, 92 yield fresh perspectives when applied to the presidential context.
i. Strategic Self-Insulation. - The basic insight pursued in depth
here is that resource-constrained agencies can choose among various
regulatory forms and strategies to achieve their desired results while at
the same time making it more difficult for the institutional President to
review and reverse them. Specifically, they can make such review
more difficult by increasing the costs of review, thereby forcing the
President to spend his limited resources more selectively such that he
reverses fewer decisions and affirms the rest. In this manner, agency
instruments that increase reviewing costs effectively serve to insulate
discrete decisions within a rule or across rules. Holding other factors
constant, agencies will be more likely to self-insulate the greater their
perceived preference divergence from the President. In other words,
one would expect to observe self-insulation more when the agency expects the President to be an enemy (with different preferences), rather
than an ally (with the same preferences); the agency seeks to shield decisions more from the former than the latter. 3 Moreover, because
agencies are repeat players that would undoubtedly earn the executive
branch's displeasure by recurrent and brazen attempts to self-insulate,
they are likely to do so only when most valuable to them - when the
probability of reversal is greatest but not certain, when decision costs
and resource investment are relatively high, or more generally, when
agencies receive the most benefit from doing so.
To help motivate this account, begin by considering a familiar
analogy: that of trial judges who seek to avoid reversal upon appellate
review. Reversals can impose real resource costs on trial judges in the
form of new trials and motions on remand, and they can impose reputational costs as well. 9 4 Trial judges thus have strong incentives to insulate their decisions and minimize the probability of reversal. A trial
judge might do so, for example, by writing an opinion that turns more
heavily on a finding of fact than a question of law in order to take advantage of a more favorable standard upon appellate review (say,

92 See Emerson H. Tiller, Commentary, Resource-Based Strategies in Law and Positive Political Theory: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Like, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1461-62 (2002); Tiller &
Spiller, supra note 3, at 352-62.
93 See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Essay, Delegating to Enemies, 112 COLUM.
L. REV. 2193 (2012) (using terminology).
94 See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction:The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1994); Stephen J. Choi et al., What Do Federal
District Judges Want? An Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J.L. EcON. &
ORG. 518, 518-19 (2012); David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85
WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 702-03 (2007).
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"clearly erroneous" instead of "de novo").9 5 Because of the more deferential standard, an appellate judge seeking to reverse this decision
would have to use more resources to examine the record and describe
her rationale in greater detail. As a result, a resource-constrained appellate judge would have less incentive to reverse this fact-bound decision. In this manner, the trial judge would have insulated her decision.
So too can administrative agencies self-insulate under presidential
review. Of course, the analogy is imperfect; for starters, judges have
life tenure, a lack of mission orientation, and so on. The nature of judicial reversal is also less iterative and dynamic than in the presidential context, as we shall see.96 But the analogy is not illusory either:
the "basic modalities of [presidential] review" since Reagan's executive
order have been "drawn, perhaps unconsciously, from appellate court
review of agency rules."97 Those modalities themselves, in turn, "borrowed from the understandings that govern the relationship between
appeals courts and trial courts in civil litigation."98 In other words,
presidential review was designed with the appellate court review model in mind.99 As in that model, review occurs as a matter of ex post
oversight after many of the major substantive and procedural decisions, whether during trials or agency rule-drafting, have already been
made. In this sense, both appellate court and presidential review represent opportunities for strategic behavior, "where the ability to manipulate the instruments of decision making, rather than merely selecting policy choices, allows actors to insulate their policy choices from
higher level review." 0 0
To explore these implications in greater depth, the remaining analysis will largely treat agencies and the President as unitary actors with
exogenous preferences, though it will later relax some of these assumptions. These simplifications allow for greater initial analytic traction
and are also reasonable as a first approximation: agencies move first
when they submit a regulatory action for review in anticipation of
what they know (or think they know) about the President's preferences
95 See HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF
REVIEW 19, 23 (2007); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, JudicialFact Discretion,37 J. LEGAL
STUD. I, 3 (2oo8); cf Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24,
24-25 (2007) (hypothesizing that sentencing judges pursue policy preferences, in part, by making
fact-oriented determinations that garner a deferential standard of review).
96 See infra section I.B.2, pp. 1777-81.
97 E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB: Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order
12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Spring 1994, at 167, 170.
98 See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate
Review Model of Administrative Law, III COLUM. L. REV. 939, 940 (2011).
99 See Elliott, supra note 97, at 170.

10 Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 349.
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before the review process begins.o10 Even when those predictions may
be wrong, the uncertainties about what the agency may discover during a costly review can be incentive enough to engage in selfinsulation. As others have noted, the process was mainly "designed as
an end-of-the-pipeline check against poorly conceived regulations,"10 2
thus "operating as a kind of last-minute barrier to action at a point
when cooperation and trust are nearly impossible." 0 3 In other words,
while endogenous preference-shifting by both the agency and the President is possible and undoubtedly occurs,10 4 the structure and constraints of the review process can often make the prospect more difficult.
Of course, in reality the "agency" and the "President" are not singular entities; rather, they are institutions. Institutions have multiple actors within them, each playing various roles. Consider the "agency"
(we will consider the "President" in more depth too, but much later).
Agencies have career staff with tenure protections and no expressed
political loyalties, 0 5 as well as agency heads appointed by the President, subject to typically deferential Senate approval, and removable
at will.' 0 6 But if the President appoints executive branch agency

101 See HUBER, supra note 24, at 24 (discussing "notions of bureaucratic anticipation" whereby
bureaucrats can "alter the status quo policy over which external political bargaining takes place"
by "moving first").
102 OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
MAKING SENSE OF REGULATION: 2ool REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE COSTS AND BEN-

EFITS OF REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL
ENTITIES 43 (2ooi), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb
/inforeg/costbenefitreport.pdf.
103 Pildes & Sunstein, supra note go, at 16. In interviews conducted by Professors Lisa
Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh:
Some EPA respondents commented that OIRA review occurs too late in the rulemaking process. OIRA "is a reactive organization. It receives rules over the transom
that agencies have already prepared. [OIRA has] ninety days to review [the rules and]
on the eighty-ninth day, they say 'we don't like it, do over.' Early interaction would be
helpful so that we don't waste each other's time."
Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 95 (alterations in original).
104 See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1848 (recalling "countless instances in which the process of
interagency comment during OIRA review, or the agency's own continuing consideration of the
underlying issues, leads the agency to make changes quickly and with enthusiasm"); id. at 1856
("It is possible that technical experts at the rulemaking agency will decide to revise their analysis
and even their conclusions in light of insights provided by other technical experts."). Professor
Cass Sunstein's account emphasizes the ways in which an agency's views can and do shift during
the review process in response to the "dispersed information inside and outside the federal government" aggregated during review. Id. at 1874. Future work should accordingly extend this
framework to incorporate more fully the endogenous preferences of the agency and the President.
105 See RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY 7 (1994) ("[Rank-and-file career employees] have
strict tenure guarantees, have no expressed ties to the administration or to Congress, and by law
are to be politically neutral.").
106 Of course, this statement is itself a simplification. As Professors Ronald N. Johnson and
Gary D. Libecap explain:
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heads and can fire them without cause, why would one ever expect
agency and presidential preferences to diverge? The short answer is
that the President and his agency heads suffer from familiar principalagent problems, which can be exacerbated by similar issues between
agency heads and their career staff.10 7 Indeed, while this story is in
part about the potential conflict between the President and his appointees, it is perhaps even more so about the incentives of the quasiindependent federal bureaucracy relative to its multiple overseers.
First, even the most faithful civil servants and loyal agency heads
may have divergent preferences due to what they perceive (rightly or
wrongly) as more refined information about implementation difficulties
or political sensitivities.108 Because of the transaction costs of briefing
and elevating issues, such information may be difficult to convey fully
to superiors. The agency head or civil servant may thus resist entreaties due to constraints "of which the Executive is only dimly
aware." 0 9 Moreover, many decisions are necessarily made at the
career-staff level and never elevated, despite what could be the contrary wishes of agency heads or the President had they been informed of
the issues. This prospect need not be a pernicious one: it can also be a
function of limited resources and the need to prioritize among issues
worthy of higher-level attention. Alternatively, preference divergence
may arise because of the President's own transaction costs in communicating his priorities and having them filter down multiple levels
in ways that facilitate informed elevation of an issue.
Moreover, there is the well-known prospect of bureaucratic capture - the notion that both career and political agency actors may become beholden to external special interests, whether the regulated industry or broader public interest groups.1 0 The notorious "revolving
Distinctions must be made among political appointees, who hold the top positions in
most agencies; senior career officials, who hold positions in the Senior Executive Service
(SES) or have top management General Schedule positions . .. within the civil service;
and the rank-and-file career workforce . . . . These three groups have very different incentives for policy administration and operate under different constraints within the
bureaucracy.
Id. at 7. For another, more nuanced discussion of internal agency dynamics, see Magill &
Vermeule, supra note 2.
107 Much empirical evidence supports the notion that the preferences of career civil servants
within an agency diverge from those of political appointees. See, e.g., Clinton et al., supra note
51, at 345-46.
10 See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State,
io6 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1302-03 (2006).
109 Id. at 1303.

110 See generally, e.g., PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY

AGENCIES (1985). According to this argument, regulated industries have the resources, incentives, and information necessary to influence agency career staff or political appointees. Similarly,
public interest groups are also influential given their ability to marshal publicity and political
pressure. See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 117-
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door" between agencies and industry only reinforces this concern."'
Alternatively, career staff may have been hired or may have selfselected due to the agency's single-mission orientation, bringing to the
job a narrowly focused zeal.1 2 They may in turn influence political
appointees who may end up "go[ing] native" and supporting the views
of their entrenched staff.113 Finally, the difficulties of the confirmation
process, especially under divided government, may also result in appointees whose preferences are not fully aligned with the President's
due to compromises struck with Congress.114 In a similar vein, a host
of dynamic, exogenous factors, including pressure from congressional
committees and interest groups, will also increase the likelihood of disagreement over individual rules. For any of these reasons, there is the
potential for preference divergence between the President and even his
most loyal appointed agency heads or faithful career staff. Putting the
cover back on the agency, this analysis will assume that agencies as
units behave accordingly; opportunities for preference divergence
abound.
At the same time, agencies and Presidents - like trial judges and
appellate courts - make decisions with limited resources. Thus, understanding the costs each incurs by initiating and reviewing an action
is critical to appreciating their respective incentives. Call these decision costs for the agency and reviewing costs for the President."is
Both kinds of costs include the resources required to acquire, synthesize, and deliberate over the information necessary to reach a rational
conclusion, as well as the costs of communicating that conclusion. Say,
for example, that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required by statute to ensure that cooling-water intake structures reflect
the "best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental
impact."" 6 In considering how to fulfill this statutory mandate for ex-

2I(1981) (discussing role of industry and public interest groups); Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L.
Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L.
ECoN. & ORG. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 167, 169 (iggo).
111 See QUIRK, supra note Ilo, at 143-74.

112 See Bagley & Revesz, supra note io8, at 13o-02; David B. Spence, Administrative Law and
Agency Policymaking: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG.
407, 424 (1997) ("[A]n agency with a well-defined mission will tend to attract bureaucrats whose
goals are sympathetic to that mission.").
113 Elliott, supra note 97, at 176. These views may be particularly informed by some career
staff who have spent decades or even their entire careers at the agency, perhaps becoming heavily
invested in the release of internally resource-intensive regulatory actions. See CORNELIUS M.
KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING 129-164 (4 th ed. 2011) (discussing complex

and resource-intensive processes for managing the internal agency development of rules).
114 See generally McCarty, supra note 53.
115 The term "decision cost" is used by Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 351.
116 This hypothetical is based loosely on the situation that faced by the EPA in Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009).
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isting structures, the EPA might engage in outreach through public
meetings and might conduct research on how cooling-water intake
structures damage the environment. After studying the problem, the
EPA might determine that there are various technologies available to
reduce the number of fish and other species killed in these structures
(such as mesh screens or barrier nets), and that some technologies are
more effective than others and should be used accordingly. The costs
of arriving at this decision constitute the EPA's decision costs.
After it has decided on an outcome, an agency must also decide
what means, or instruments, it will use to pursue and communicate
that outcome. 1 ' As we shall see, these instruments include the literature's familiar catalogue of adjudication, guidance documents, and
rulemaking."18 But the following discussion also considers a broader
set of instruments, as well as the instruments' institutional dimensions:
for example, how the instruments are characterized by agencies (their
significance determinations), the quality of information conveyed by
their accompanying cost-benefit analyses, various timing decisions, and
the internal coalitions built in support of an agency's action.
Returning to our simple example, once the EPA decides to regulate
cooling-water intake structures to reduce environmental harm, it can
pursue this approach through discrete permitting decisions, through a
guidance document describing various available technologies for
facility-specific determinations,' 1 9 or by eventually undertaking a
rulemaking to set a standard or to mandate a particular technology.12 0
All of these instruments vary in their form and impact, and the discretion to use them can be constrained by statute; such a statute may dictate, for example, the substance, form, and timelines for agency action.
Within these bounds, agencies will consider decision costs for themselves, as well as the reviewing costs the chosen instrument imposes on
the executive branch. In other words, faced with the prospect of presidential review, agencies can choose among various instruments to advance their regulatory policies, but their choices will depend on the
relative effectiveness of those instruments as well as the costs of review
they expect those instruments to impose on the President.
To illustrate, say there is a Republican President in power who has
campaigned on reducing the number of regulations and blocking costly
117 Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 351.
118 See, e.g., Magill, supra note 3, at 1396 (examining the consequences of "administrative adju-

dication, legislative rulemaking, or the issuance of a guidance document").
119 See, e.g., OFFICE OF WATER ENFORCEMENT PERMITS Div., EPA, DRAFT GUIDANCE
FOR EVALUATING THE ADVERSE IMPACT OF COOLING WATER INTAKE STRUCTURES ON
THE AQUATIC ENVIRONMENT SECTION 316(b) P.L. 92-500 (1977).
120 See Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1503-04 (describing the EPA's use of permitting decisions, guidance documents, and eventually rulemaking); Brief for the Federal Parties as Respondents Supporting Petitioners at 5-7, Entergy, 129 S. Ct. 1498 (Nos. 07-588, 07-589, 07-597).
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new ones. The EPA knows that if it decides to pursue a policy
through its permitting decisions for cooling-water intake structures,
then these adjudicatory decisions will not be subject to presidential review and are thus immune from reversal. If the EPA chooses the
guidance document route, however, it knows that the executive branch
might review the document, but that it will be more difficult to reverse
since the document is not legally binding and so its effects are unclear.
For the same reasons, however, the instrument will be less effective in
bringing about its desired policy changes. Alternatively, the EPA is also aware that if it undertakes a rulemaking, it will likely be required to
prepare a resource-intensive cost-benefit analysis. Because of the Republican President's business-friendly stance, the EPA is concerned
that preparing a thorough cost-benefit analysis may make it easier for
the rule to be reversed since the analysis could reveal expensive burdens on industry.
With these various choices, agencies can insulate their decisions
from review by increasing the costs of review, which would decrease
the probability of reversal due to the President's resource constraints.
In our example, the EPA could choose to issue a guidance document
instead of a rule to reduce the policy's visibility, but doing so would
also bring about the EPA's policy changes less effectively given the
nonbinding nature of guidance documents. Alternatively, the EPA
could produce a low-quality cost-benefit analysis when submitting a
rule. Both of these sttategies are examples of self-insulation, since in
both cases the President would have to spend greater resources to
identify, review, and justify a reversal.
To avoid reversal, then, agencies may trade off their own "institutional efficiency" (the ability to achieve an outcome with the lowestcost instrument' 2 1 ), provided that the selected higher-cost instrument
imposes greater reviewing costs on the executive branch.12 2 In other
words, an agency will pursue a policy as close to its preferences as possible through a strategic instrument choice that takes into account,
among other things, the costs imposed upon the reviewer and the corresponding likelihood of presidential reversal.
2. PresidentialReversals. The power to review implies the ability to examine something again ("re-view") as well as the authority to

121 Agency adjudication and guidance documents, for example, yield lower impacts given that
one proceeds on a case-by-case basis and the other uses legally nonbinding guidance to advance a
regulatory policy. By contrast, rulemaking is more effective in implementing a policy, though the
absolute degree of that impact will depend on the substance of the rule. See generally Colin S.
Diver, Policymaking Paradigmsin Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (ig8i).
122 See Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 35 1-52.
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instruct an agent or subordinate based on that evaluation. 12 3 Whether
that presidential authority is directive or supervisory is a matter of
much academic debate,12 4 but when viewed against the backdrop of
at-will removal, as a practical matter, presidential review shares several structural similarities with judicial review. Namely, OIRA can effectively reverse an agency action on behalf of the President and his
interagency reviewers in a number of ways.12 5 just as agencies can
choose regulatory instruments, the President has various reversal instruments at his disposal. They are "reversals" in the sense that the interagency review process can result in revisions or changes that the
agency does not otherwise prefer, but which it will make due to the
threat of delay or return, or because of resource constraints.126 These
reversal instruments can be arrayed in terms of their respective reviewing costs, which increase the more public the reversal and, correspondingly, the more reasoned the explanation required for it.
To begin, OIRA can "return" a rule to an agency "for further consideration of some or all of its provisions."1 27 While this procedure is
infrequently invoked, the threat is real and has, at times, been vigorously exercised. For each return, the Administrator of OIRA provides

123 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1434 (9 th ed. 2009) (defining "review" as the
"[c]onsideration, inspection, or reexamination of a subject or thing" as well as the "[pllenary power
to direct and instruct an agent or subordinate, including the right to remand, modify, or vacate
any action by the agent or subordinate, or to act directly in place of the agent or subordinate").
124 See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, PresidentialControl of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 443, 462 (1987); Robert V Percival, Who's in Charge? Does the PresidentHave
Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2488-90
(2011); Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The Presidentin Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 697 (2007). Some have argued that the President also possesses
what Professors Peter Strauss and Cass Sunstein have called "procedural" supervisory authority
over agency heads from whom the President can demand information and engage in consultation.
See Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. I8I, 200 (1986); see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, Cl. I (granting the
President the authority to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices"). Indeed, this argument heavily informed the Office of Legal Counsel memorandum authorizing President Reagan's regulatory review executive order. See Proposed Exec. Order Entitled "Federal
Regulation," 5 Op. O.L.C. 59, 63 (1981). Practically speaking, these reversal mechanisms are also
powerfully backed by the "de facto veto" inherent in the President's at-will removal power, as
well as the authority accorded by executive order. But this is not to say that such formal authority
need be explicitly invoked in order for it to have effect. See Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew
C. Stephenson, Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight, 1o AM. POL. SCI. REV. 605, 6o6
n.5 (2007).
125 See Sunstein,

supra note 27, at 1846-47.
126 By implication, this category and analysis do not include those situations where agency
preferences are endogenous and shift as a result of the interagency review process, such that the
agency accepts the revisions "quickly and with enthusiasm." See id. at 1848; supra note 104.
127 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(C)( 3 ), 3 C.F.R. 638, 647 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 6os app. at 86-91 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011).
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"a written explanation for such return,"1 28 commonly known as a "return letter." The parallel to judicial reversal and remand is likely
clear. Aside from agency-head removal, return letters are the most
costly reversal instrument because they require a public rationale.
During the first seven years after President Clinton issued Executive
Order 12,866, from 1994 to 2000, OIRA returned only a handful of the
500 to 7oo rules for which it coordinated review: three rules in

1995,

and four in 1997.129 Under the subsequent Bush Administration, by
contrast, OIRA publicly posted forty-two return letters explaining various disagreements with the agencies' rules.130 To date, the Obama
Administration has issued only one.' 3 ' This pattern could suggest that
more antiregulatory Presidents incur fewer political costs relative to
proregulatory Presidents when issuing public return letters.
At the same time, however, "it is misleading to focus on the number
of return letters as a measure of OIRA's impact," since executive
branch reviewers may still be "acting aggressively" in their absence.132
Indeed, as part of the review process, interagency and White House
reviewers can also negotiate revisions to a draft rule before agreeing to
a version upon which to conclude review. Each time there is another
round of comments or edits from reviewers, OIRA compiles and
"transmit[s]" them back to the agency.1 33 The agency can respond to
these comments, make revisions, and circulate a new draft during the
review period, if it so chooses and to the extent time permits. 3 4
Regulatory submissions have a host of elements, including preambles, new and revised regulatory text, alternatives, effective dates,
statutory interpretations, and cost-benefit estimates, among other provisions. The regulatory actions can also take different forms, such as
advance notices of proposed rulemaking or interim final rules, and so
on. Each of these agency "decisions" within a rule or about the form
of a rule can be the subject of comment and possible reversal during
the interagency review process. These revisions can be loosely analo128 Id.
129 See GAO, REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note I5, at 42 fig.5.
letters in 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999, and 2000. Id.

There were no return

130 Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political" Oversight of Agency Decision Making,

108

MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1150(2010).

131 See Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa P.
Jackson, Adm'r, EPA (Sept. 2, 2ol), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default
/files/ozonenationalambientairquality-standardsjletter.pdf.
132 Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1846 n.37.
133 Id. at 1858.
134 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-og-205, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF RULES DEVELOPMENT AS
WELL AS TO THE TRANSPARENCY OF OMB REGULATORY REVIEWS 53-90 (2009) [hereinaf-

ter GAO, MONITORING & TRANSPARENCY] (describing sixteen case studies of selected rules
and changes due to presidential review).
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gized to the multiple reversals and remands with instructions after judicial review in the course of serial litigation.13 5 Sometimes these multiple rounds of revision and interagency review can be lengthy, resulting in significant delays.13 6
To put this category of reversals into perspective, even seemingly
minor revisions may upend the product of hard-won compromises
with agencies and external constituencies (including legislative staff,
industry, and interest groups), as well as internal agency stakeholders
among career staff and policy officials (including lawyers, economists,
scientists, and policy analysts).' 3 7 Agencies, which have often spent
sizeable resources throughout the rulemaking process, can be loathe to
see these hard-won balances upset and their work overturned. Of
course, they may be indifferent to particular revisions when the stakes
are low; in other situations, however, the threat of reversal is costly
and real.
As for these reversal costs, the effective ability to insist on these revisions will depend on the amount of political capital and resources
required. Specifically, these costs will be a function of the resources
necessary to communicate the issue to the agency or other interagency
reviewers, whether in terms of briefings or meetings, as well as the political capital necessary to elevate the issue to higher-level officials and,
ultimately, to refuse to conclude upon the rule in its current form.13 s
Evidence from a 2003 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
suggests that presidential reversals, even within a rule, are nontrivial
in effect. Specifically, the report finds that the review process resulted
in "significant" or "material" changes to fifty-one of the subset of
eighty-five rules examined (sixty percent).' 39 The report defined these
changes as those made at a reviewer's suggestion that "affected the
scope, impact, or estimated costs and benefits" of the submitted rules,
or "resulted in the addition or deletion of material in the explanatory
preamble section of the rule."140

135 See id. at 82 (discussing example including resubmission of multiple drafts of FDA rule during review); cf Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, iii
COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1722 (2011) (exploring dynamic whereby "courts and agencies carry out a

revealing colloquy over the course of successive reviews and remands" during serial litigation).
136 See GAO, REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note Is, at 46 (quoting President Clinton's
OIRA Administrator testifying that "when two or more agencies are at loggerheads over a regulatory issue, it may well take more than go, or even 120, days to obtain needed data and analyses, to
conduct the appropriate evaluation, and to arrange for the policy officials in the interested agencies to come to agreement" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
137 See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1036-41.
138 See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1856-58 (discussing "elevation').
139 See GAO, REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note
140 See id. at 73.

15,

at 73-75.
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In addition to these dispositions, OIRA can also "encourage" an
agency to "withdraw" a rule, 14 1 presumably because the review reveals
the likelihood that OIRA, on behalf of executive branch reviewers,
would not conclude on the rule in its present form.14 2 The costs to the
President of these withdrawals will depend on the stage of the rulemaking process. Before an agency proposes a rule, it can quietly
withdraw the rule without publishing anything; however, OIRA's public database notes the simple fact of withdrawal.14 3 Thus, at this
point, the reversal costs are relatively low. After an agency has already publicly proposed a rule, though not yet finalized it, the agency
may unilaterally withdraw it without notice-and-comment; however,
the agency will have already made public its contemplated course of
action.144 As a result, there will be greater costs to reversing the agency and having it withdraw the rule at this stage, given that the President will feel more pressure from monitoring groups opposed to this
action. 4 s Finally, the review can also result in no revisions or changes
to the rule at all. In such a case, the rule that was submitted to OIRA
for review is the same as the rule upon which OIRA concludes review.
It has been affirmed.
Which reversal instrument the President ultimately chooses, in
turn, will depend on these reviewing costs, his available resources, and
how far his preferences diverge from those of the agency.14 6 If their
preferences are sufficiently close, and the agency has used an instrument rendering reversal a costly enough proposition, then the President will affirm the agency's decision.14 As the preference divergence
grows and as the costs of reversal diminish, the President will be more
likely to reverse the agency.148 At some point, however, the preference
divergence can be so great that the President will reverse the agency's
decision even if the cost required to do so is significant.

141 See COPELAND, supra note

15, at i; Sunstein, supranote 27, at 1846-47.
See O'Connell, supra note 21, at 477-79.
143 See Historical Reports, OFFICE INFO. & REG. AFF., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do
/eoHistoricReport (last visited Mar. 30, 2013); see also GAO, REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra
note 15, at 30 fig-4 (illustrating OIRA review process including the possibility of withdrawal for
draft proposed rules).
144 See O'Connell, supra note 21, at 477.
145 See, e.g., Kevin Bogardus, Labor Unions Uneasy as OSHA Withdraws Proposed Rules,
HILL (Jan. 30, 2011, 6:14 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/14112i-labor-uneasy-as-osha
-withdraws-proposed-rules.
146 Cf Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 355-56 (providing a more formal analysis of these dynamics in the context of court-agency interaction).
142

147 See id. at 356.
148 See id.
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II. AGENCY SELF-INSULATION
A. Self-Insulation Mechanisms
Faced with these reversal prospects, agencies as the first movers
can choose from an array of regulatory instruments, each with different expected effects on presidential review. An agency will, in turn, be
more likely to use those instruments that will insulate its decisions
from review the more it expects presidential preferences to diverge
from its own, all else being equal. The agency's equilibrium choice,
then, will depend on its decision costs and the points at which it expects to avoid reversal,14 9 background conditions for this section's
closer examination of the various ways in which agencies can attempt
to raise the costs of review and ultimately reversal. 50 These selfinsulation mechanisms are the institutional means through which
agencies can render the process more resource-intensive, thereby increasing the probability of insulation. These mechanisms can be classified in terms of their functional effects: to bypass review, to decrease
scrutiny, to truncate the amount of time available, or to facilitate successful internal coalitions. They will each require their own respective
decision costs, 5 1 but they share the ability to help minimize the probability of reversal.
Presidential review currently covers "regulatory aci. Bypass. tion[s]" that are "significant."1 5 2 Regulatory actions, in turn, include
"any substantive action . . . that promulgates or is expected to lead to
the promulgation of a final rule or regulation, including notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, and notices of pro149 These points would depend on the President's expected instruments and policy choices. Cf
id. at 371-73 (discussing equilibrium instruments and policy outcomes in the context of judicial
review).
150 In other words, this section examines the costs of the review process that will necessarily
precede each of the President's potential reversal instruments.
151 Bypass strategies may require higher decision costs relative to nonbypass strategies since
they are largely efforts by agencies to switch to policymaking forms that are not or will not lead to
legislative rulemakings. Assuming that rules can induce greater policy changes relative to caseby-case adjudication or nonbinding guidance documents, bypass efforts are more internally costly
(though an agency may trade these off for their effects on presidential review). Cf Tiller & Spiller,
supra note 3, at 360-61. Decreasing scrutiny, in turn, yields lower decision costs, because this
strategy usually requires less of an investment in the substance and form of cost-benefit analysis.
The decision costs of timing strategies are harder to assess, though there is likely an internal cost
to submitting a rule late given the need for more justification that must be provided to OIRA.
Finally, coalition-building efforts are more costly for the agency, and thus will likely be undertaken for rules with greater policy impacts or of more importance to the agency. Each of these considerations may help to explain when agencies will choose among various self-insulation mechanisms; though this interinstrumental choice is not considered in depth here, it may be an extension
worthy of future exploration.
152 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. §6oi app. at 86-91 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011).
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posed rulemaking."15 3 These provisions define the scope of regulatory
review. Any scope-defining provision of an institutionalized review
process, however, begets incentives for agencies to employ instruments
that attempt to bypass the costly process entirely, and thus avoid the risk
of reversal altogether. This section surveys some of those instruments.
(a) Inaction. - As stated, Executive Order 12,866 requires agencies to submit "significant regulatory action[s]" to OIRA for presidential review.1 5 4 If an agency does not affirmatively engage in regulatory
action, this decision does not undergo presidential review. According
to a Congressional Research Service report, "some agencies have indicated that they do not even propose certain regulatory provisions because they believe that OIRA would find them objectionable."'
An
agency may choose not to act because of its own internal resource constraints or because of the threat of presidential review. While the empirical outcome is the same -

no new regulatory action -

the distinc-

tion is still important to keep in mind as an analytic matter.
Relative to the status quo, there are no affirmative impacts of
agency inaction (by definition). However, as others have noted, agency
inaction can nonetheless have important consequences (for example,
the failure to regulate a pollutant can have adverse impacts on public
health) - a decision that is not currently subject to presidential review.' 5 6 While the consequences of agency inaction can indeed be significant, the decision facing the agency in the present analysis is
whether to depart from the status quo. Relative to this baseline, a decision not to depart -

not to act -

can be understood as yielding no

new, marginal impacts on the state of the world.
(b) Adjudication and Guidance Documents. - Agencies can also
bypass presidential review by choosing an instrument other than "any
substantive action" that "promulgates or is expected to lead to the
promulgation of a final rule or regulation."15 One such instrument is
adjudication. This category of agency action could include benefits
determinations and licensing proceedings, among other actions. 5 8 Be153 Id. § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. at 641. Such rules include any "agency statement of general applicability
and future effect, which the agency intends to have the force and effect of law, that is designed to
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or to describe the procedure or practice requirements of an agency." Id. § 3(d), 3 C.F.R. at 641. This category does not include formal rulemaking, rules related to military and foreign affairs, or other enumerated exceptions. Id. § 3(d)(I)-( ),
4
3 C.FR. at 641.
154 Id. § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. at 645 (emphasis added).
155 COPELAND, supra note I, at 18.
156 See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY
155-56 (2008); Michael A. Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Gridlock, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 118-ig (2oo8).
157 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. at 641.
158 Magill, supra note 3, at 1386; see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2006) (defining "order" as "the
whole or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in
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cause adjudication, unlike rulemaking, proceeds on a case-by-case basis, each adjudication's policy impacts are limited and aggregate policy
change is developed only incrementally. As a result, there is relatively
little information to review and, in any case, adjudication decisions are
not subject to the presidential review process. Case studies of particular agencies - such as the National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA), which shifted from rulemaking to adjudication
in the mid-197os due in part to changes in presidential administrations - provide evidence of this dynamic. 5 9 As permitted by statute,
courts have consistently allowed agencies to choose between these policymaking forms.' 60
Alternatively, an agency could issue a guidance document.16 1
Guidance documents are interpretive rules and statements of policy intended to clarify existing regulatory requirements, though they have
often been criticized as creating new obligations upon private parties
without the traditional requirements imposed on legislative rulemaking.162 Guidance documents are exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act's notice-and-comment requirements and thus less internally
costly for the agency relative to rulemaking.163 They sometimes enable
agencies to obtain voluntary compliance, either because the agencies
wield "gatekeeping" power over private parties or because savvy regulatory targets foresee forthcoming policy shifts.164 However, as a practical matter, guidance documents are not legally binding, and are thus
likely to be less effective than rulemaking in bringing about the desired behavioral changes.165

form, of an agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing"); id. § 551(7) (defining "adjudication" as an "agency process for the formulation of an order").
159 See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY ioII (1990) (describing NHTSA's "retreat[]" from rulemaking to "case-by-case adjudication," id. at
ii). Professors Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst also observe that while such retreats "have been
responsive to general political shifts in regulatory zeal," they are not only retreats "from regulation," but "to regulation in a different form." Id. at 14 (citing also the example of the Consumer
Product Safety Commission as an agency that "turned from standard setting to recalls").
160 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194 (1947); see also Magill, supra note 3, at 1385 (describing courts' largely "hands-off" reaction to
agencies' choice of policymaking form).
161 Note, of course, that guidance documents that initiate a process culminating in rulemaking
would be covered under presidential review. See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1853.
162 See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the
Like -

Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1332-

55 (1992).

163 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (b) (creating exceptions for "interpretive rules" or "general statements of
policy").
164 See Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, i9

YALE L.J. 782, 803-04 (2010).

165 Id. at 803.
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"Significant" guidance documents, defined under a multifactor test
including expected economic impacts and policy novelty, are currently
subject to presidential review. 6 6 They garnered much attention in
January 2007, when President George W. Bush amended President
Clinton's executive order to formally subject such guidance documents
to review, though President Obama has since revoked the amendments.16 7 Around the time the order was amended, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) also released its Final Bulletin for Agency
Good Guidance Practices, which directed agencies to implement procedures for the approval and use of significant guidance documents by
appropriate senior officials, sought to standardize the documents' elements, and established public access and feedback procedures.16
Before then, presidential review of such documents was at best
sporadic, with one former OIRA Administrator, Sally Katzen, testifying that President Clinton's "'Executive Order . . . was written to apply only where agencies undertook regulatory actions that had the
force and effect of law' and that she [had] never reviewed a guidance
document during her tenure in the Clinton administration."16 9 After
President Obama revoked the Bush amendments and returned to the
unamended Clinton executive order,17 0 however, OMB Director Peter
Orszag issued a memorandum to agencies stating that OIRA had previously reviewed "significant policy and guidance documents" and that
such documents remained subject to review.''
Relative to the review of rules, however, the review of guidance
documents is much more limited and unsystematic in practice.' 7 2 This
is partly because guidance documents as a class are not required to
undergo formal notice-and-comment procedures, so there are fewer
166 See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads and Acting Heads of Exec. Dep'ts and Agencies (Mar. 4, 2oo9) [hereinafter Orszag Memorandum], available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda-fy20o9/mo9-I3.pdf.

167 See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008) (revoked 2009); see also Exec. Order No.

53,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (20o0), reprintedas amended in 5 U.S.C. § 6o app. at loc-ol (2006 & Supp.
V 2011) (revoking amendments).
168 See Paul R. Noe & John D. Graham, Due Process and Management for Guidance Documents: Good Governance Long Overdue, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 103, 103 n.I (2oo8); see also Final
Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432-33 (Jan. 25, 2007), avail-

able at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memorandalfy2007/mo7-07.pdf.
169 Noe & Graham, supra note 168, at 1o5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Amending Executive
Order 12866: Good Governance or Regulatory Usurpation? Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, iioth Cong. 54 (2007) (statement of

Sally Katzen, Adjunct Professor, University of Michigan School of Law)).
170 See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218.
171 Orszag Memorandum, supra note 166.
172 See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy:A StructuralPerspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I, 27 n.98 (2008) ("OIRA's analysis of these guidance documents
(even 'significant' guidance documents that have an estimated impact of $ioo million or more on
the economy) is much more limited than its analysis of regulations.").
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opportunities for fire-alarm oversight by outside monitoring groups regarding each document's significance, making the agency's own initial
significance determination that much more critical.1 3 In addition,
guidance documents that are not expected to lead to a final regulation
are not required by executive order to provide a cost-benefit analysis
(CBA), further limiting the information about their potential impacts
and therefore their potential significance to the President.'7 4 Finally,
the sheer number of such documents likely constrains the amount of
time available to review each one.175 To be sure, many agencies will
be hesitant to "issue important regulatory documents that have not
been seen by, or (if appropriate) incorporated the perspectives of, senior officials inside the administration."17 6 But when the question of
significance is sufficiently close or ambiguous from the agency's perspective, the perceived costs of review may well outweigh the potential
benefits to the agency.
(c) Nonsignificant Rules. - Recall again that Executive Order
12,866 requires agencies to submit "significant" regulatory actions to
OIRA for presidential review.' 7 7 If choosing rulemaking as a regulatory instrument, agencies can thus prevent review by avoiding a determination that the rule is "significant." To be significant, a regulatory
action must meet at least one of four sets of flexible criteria: it must
raise potential inconsistencies with other agencies, "materially alter the
budgetary impact of" certain programs, invoke "novel legal or policy
issues," or be economically significant.178

173 OMB's good guidance practices do, however, provide that "[elach agency shall maintain on
its Web site ... a current list of its significant guidance documents in effect" and "shall establish
and clearly advertise on its Web site a means for the public to submit comments electronically on
significant guidance documents." Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72 Fed.
Reg. at 3440. For "economically significant" guidance documents, the bulletin states that agencies
"shall" generally provide notice and invite public comment. Id. Many agencies follow these procedures, but note that they rely upon the agency's own assessment of what constitutes a "significant" or "economically significant" guidance document, raising the same issues of significance determinations as for rules. See infra section II.A.i.c, pp. 1786-89.
174 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 §3(e), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 6oi app. at 86-91 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
175 See Noe & Graham, supra note 168, at 104 ("Each year, agencies issue on the order of 4000
regulations, and the number of guidance documents is orders of magnitude larger." (footnote
omitted)).
176 Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1853.
177 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 §6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. at 645.
171 Id. § (3 )(f), 3 C.F.R. at 641-42. The text in full states:
"Significant regulatory action" means any regulatory action that is likely to result in a
rule that may:
(i) Have an annual effect on the economy of $ioo million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition,
jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or
communities;

2013]1

AGENCY SELF-INSULATION

I1787

Significance determinations rely on agencies to identify such rules
"in the first instance, vetted by OIRA."7') Because the burden is initially on the agencies to highlight significant rules, OIRA must rely on
agencies to flag rules as such, or at least to give enough information to
enable it to make an independent determination. Rules that an agency
does not identify as significant are thus more likely to go unnoticed.
Various tools exist to facilitate OIRA's determination, but the information these tools provide is often framed so generally as to limit the
ability for meaningful external evaluation. For example, agencies are
required by executive order to submit entries semiannually to the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, a compilation of regulatory activities planned during the next twelve
months. 8 0 These entries include, among other things, a short description of the rule, as well as the agency's priority designations - roughly, whether the agency believes the action to be nonsignificant, significant, or economically significant.' 8 ' In addition, at specified intervals,
(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or
planned by another agency;
(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan
programs or the rights and obligations of recipients thereof; or
(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's
priorities, or the principles set forth in this Executive order.
Id. OMB's CircularA-4 states that "Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to conduct a regulatory analysis for economically significant regulatory actions as defined by Section 3(f)(i)."
OMB, CIRCULAR A- 4 , supra note 77, at I.
179 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 223 (William F. Funk et al.

eds., 4 th ed. 2008); see also Memorandum from Rob Portman, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget 8
(Apr. 25, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/regulatory
matterspdf/mo7-13.pdf (referring to process for agencies to request "significance
determinations").
180 Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, U.S. GEN. SERVICES
ADMIN., http://www.gsa.gov/portal/contentIol14 (last visited Mar. 30, 2013); see also Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c), 3 C.F.R. at 642.
181 More specifically, agencies can prioritize the rule as:
(i) Economically Significant
Other Significant
... This category includes rules that the agency anticipates will be reviewed under
Executive Order 12866 or rules that are a priority of the agency head.. . .
(3) Substantive, Nonsignificant
A rulemaking that has substantive impacts but is neither Significant, nor Routine
and Frequent, nor Informational/Administrative/Other.
(4) Routine and Frequent
A rulemaking that is a specific case of a multiple recurring application of a regulatory program in the Code of Federal Regulations and that does not alter the body of the
regulation.
(5) Informational/Administrative/Other
A rulemaking that is primarily informational . . . but that the agency places in the
Unified Agenda to inform the public of the activity.
Introduction to the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions, 76 Fed. Reg.
(2)

39,992, 39,994-95 (July I, 2011).
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agencies provide OIRA with simple lists of planned regulations indicating which ones they believe are significant.18 2 Actions that do not
appear on either of these are more prone to slip through the cracks.
Moreover, many of the criteria for significance determinations, including the question of novelty, are "hardly self-defining," 83 and agencies may have good faith but nevertheless ill-informed reasons for excluding some rules and designating them as nonsignificant. Even if an
agency has initially classified a regulatory action as nonsignificant, the
executive order gives OIRA just ten days to determine otherwise, 1 8 4 a
narrow window of time in which to resolve staff-level disagreements
and elevate them if necessary. In this manner, by choosing a
nonsignificant rulemaking form, agencies can limit the amount of information for review, as well as make such review less likely. 8 5
Take, for example, a recent U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) direct final rule (DFR) that would require all USDA contractors to certify that they, their subcontractors, and suppliers are "in
compliance with all applicable labor laws," subjecting the contractor to
liability under the False Claims Act if its certification is incorrect.186
DFRs are promulgated without prior notice and comment and become
effective at some point after publication in the Federal Register unless
"adverse" comments are received.' 87 In this case, the Federal Register
reported that USDA's DFR was designated as "not significant according to Executive Order 12866 and therefore the rule has not been reviewed by OMB." 88 Commenters raised numerous objections, including claims that the provisions were too vague or burdensome, and
highly controversial.189 One commenter asserted that "USDA's han182 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 §6(a)(3)(A), 3 C.F.R. at 645. Shortly after the implementation
of the Clinton order, OIRA Administrator Sally Katzen reported: "We believe that, so far, the listing system that has been implemented contains both discipline and flexibility. Both OIRA staff
and agency staff have worked to accommodate each other's needs." Report on Executive Order
No. 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 59 Fed. Reg. 24,276, 24,286 (May io, 1994).
183 Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1852.
184 Exec. Order No. 12,866 §4(c)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 642.
185 A report on the implementation of President Clinton's executive order relayed that the definition of "significance" had been the subject of great discussion and delay. "Some of the differences," the report hypothesized, "may be attributable to the difference in the natural inclinations
of rule writers, who might prefer not to have another review layer to go through . . . ." Report on
Executive Order No. 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 59 Fed. Reg. at 24,277.
186 Agriculture Acquisition Regulation, Labor Law Violations, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,722, 74,723
(Dec. I, 2011) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. pt. 422) (direct final rule); 76 Fed. Reg. 74,755, 74,756
(Dec. I, 201 1) (proposed rule).
187 See Michael Kolber, Rulemaking Without Rules: An Empirical Study of Direct Final Rulemaking, 72 ALB. L. REV. 79, 81 (2009).

188 Agriculture Acquisition Regulation, Labor Law Violations, 76 Fed. Reg. at 74,723, 74,756.
189 Letter from Randel K. Johnson, Senior Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, to Lisa
M. Wilusz, Dir., Office of Procurement and Prop. Mgmt. 14 (Jan. 24, 2012), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/comments/20124usdablistcommentsDFR.pdf.
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dling of this regulation as a DFR suggests that in seeking OMB's
clearance, the Department characterized this [as] a minor language
change and noncontroversial[,] . .. suggest[ing] that the agency was being disingenuous in its submission to OMB."19 0 The accuracy or inaccuracy of this charge aside, given the substance of the rule and the resulting reactions, there is certainly a plausible argument that the rule
was "significant" as a novel legal or policy issue, and thus should have
been subject to presidential review. Even if OIRA had this information
and disagreed, the example would still illustrate how self-identified
nonsignificant rules can render presidential review more difficult.

To summarize, agencies can choose between simple inaction, adjudication, guidance documents, or nonsignificant rules as instruments
that are more likely as a class to bypass presidential review. These instruments vary in terms of their policy impacts and thus effectiveness.
For a resource-constrained agency, adjudication may be less effective
than guidance documents, which are themselves less effective than
nonsignificant rules. At the same time, all of these instruments may
still be attractive to the agency because they are exempt from review
altogether or contain limited amounts of information to review, thus
making them more difficult to reverse. Others have certainly recognized that agencies may strategically choose less costly instruments,
such as guidance documents over rulemaking, but they have done so
largely in the context of courts' 9 1 or Congress. 92 This discussion seeks

190 Id. at 15 (arguing that the rule raised "novel legal and policy issues," could "adversely affect
in a material way the sector of the economy defined by companies that contract with the USDA,"
and thus should have been reviewed by OIRA); see also Letter from Jeffrey A. Norris, President,
Equal Emp't Advisory Council to the Office of Procurement and Prop. Mgmt., U.S. Dep't
of Agric. (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://www.eeac.org/public/2-022a.pdf (raising similar
concerns).
191 See sources cited supra note 3.
192 See, e.g., James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the
Choice of Rulemaking Procedures:The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at iii, 112-13. While Professors James
Hamilton and Christopher Schroeder recognize that "[i]nformality . .. offers a means for regulators to evade both the constraints imposed by Congress and the courts and the executive branch
oversight exercised by OMB," id. at 147 (emphasis added), their discussion continuously emphasizes only the legislature and the judiciary. For example, their next sentences provide:
We do not claim that these informal rules go unnoticed by the legislative and judicial
branches, just as slack does not go unnoticed in general principal-agent relationships.
Rather, courts and Congress must weigh the costs of monitoring and punishing agencies
against the costs posed by agency discretion embodied in informal rules.

Id. at 147-48.
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to bring the President more firmly back into the picture in light of actors' respective budget constraints. 193
2. Scrutiny Calibration.Even if an agency is unable to bypass
review, it can also attempt to calibrate the level of scrutiny the regulatory action receives during the review process. The term "scrutiny"
here is a conscious one: just as heightened levels of judicial scrutiny
imply that an appellate judge will afford less deference to the court below, so too in the context of presidential review. Agencies that successfully lower the scrutiny of review essentially raise the costs of potential
reversal, as the President would have to use greater resources to identify and target those regulatory decisions with which he disagrees.
Economically significant rules are more likely than (merely) significant ones to garner scrutiny because higher-cost or -benefit rules are
more likely to be politically salient. Economically significant rules are
thus among those rules most likely to gain the President's attention.
Moreover, public logs reveal that such rules are more likely to become
the subject of meetings between OIRA staff and nongovernmental parties, suggesting heightened public scrutiny as well. 194 Economically
significant rules must also be accompanied by a more rigorous and
transparent CBA.19 s As a result, "[t]he level of scrutiny" of presidential review is "strongly influenced by the agency's informed and
presumptively good-faith initial designation of a regulation
as . . . 'significant,' or 'economically significant."I' 9 6 The more likely
an agency is to designate a rule as economically significant and to provide a more transparent CBA, the higher the likelihood of presidential
scrutiny.
For a rule to qualify as economically significant, the main criterion
is that it must be expected to result in "an annual effect on the economy of $ioo million or more."19 7 This threshold currently applies to the
impact of regulatory actions "in any one year and it [also] includes
benefits, costs, or transfers" - that is, "$ioo million in annual benefits,
193 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE
L.J 381, 404-08 (arguing that agency internal budget constraints influence the choice of guidance
documents).
194 See Croley, supra note 37, at 844, 871-72.
195 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 §6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645-46 (1994), reprinted as amended
in 5 U.S.C. § 6oi app. at 86-91 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011).
196 Declaration of Richard B. Belzer, Ph.D. at 9, Tafas v. Dudas, 541 F Supp. 2d 805 (E.D. Va.
2oo8) (No. I:o7cv846), 2007 WL 5061620, available at http://www.rbbelzer.com/uploads/7/I/7/
4
/7174353/tafas.ex-2i-belzer-declaration.pdf (describing experience as career civil service economist at OIRA from November 1988 until September 1998).
197 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(I), 3 C.F.R. at 641. Alternatively, the action could "adversely
affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the
environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities." Id.
These criteria are less relevant to the analysis here, though similar insights would hold. Thus, for
the sake of simplicity, this Article focuses only on the $ioo million threshold.
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or costs, or transfers" would be sufficient, while "$50 million in benefits and $49 million in costs" would not be.s98 In light of this threshold, accounts sometimes incorrectly state that OIRA staff members
conduct CBA in the first instance, as if to suggest that OIRA actually
calculates the expected costs and benefits of a regulation.19 9 In fact,
however, agencies first prepare the analyses and send the supporting
documents to OIRA, which then coordinates a review with various
other executive branch entities. This distinction is important because
of the incentives that exist for the agency during the CBA preparation
stage in anticipation of that review.
CBA means many things to different people, 2 00 yet attempts to
provide a coherent theoretical basis 20 1 belie the highly variable ways in
which agencies conduct it in practice. Some agencies prepare what
could be best described as a back-of-the-envelope estimation of regulatory impacts 20 2 - a rough accounting of the pros and cons of a rule while others undertake (or more commonly, contract out) expensive and sophisticated efforts to collect data from market behavior or
consumer-willingness-to-pay studies about a rule's monetized costs and
benefits. 2 0 3 Agencies also vary in terms of how they discount these effects, the extent to which they describe costs and benefits qualitatively

198 OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQS) 1 (2011) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter OIRA, FAQS], availa-

ble at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/OMB/circulars/aoo 4 /a-4 _FAQ.pdf.
199 See, e.g., Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 57 ("OIRA staff members are the ones
who actually conduct cost-benefit analyses."); Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Turning the
Page on the Global FinancialCrisis: Civic Capitalism and a Blueprintfor the Future, 24 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. I,

47 (2010) ("OIRA's task is essentially to evaluate all proposed regulation that

comes out of executive branch agencies, generally by conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the
proposed regulation."); see also Stuart Shapiro, OIRA Inside and Out, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 135, 139 (2011) (A "common error is assuming that cost-benefit analyses are con-

ducted by OIRA, not the agencies.").
200 See Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification,and Comment on
Conference Papers, 29

J. LEGAL STUD.

I153, 1153 (2000) ("The term 'cost-benefit analysis' has a

variety of meanings and uses.").
201 See generally ADLER & POSNER, supra note 39, at 9-24; EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD
ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 134-58 (1978).

202 See, e.g., Default Investment Alternatives Under Participant Directed Individual Account
Plans, 72 Fed. Reg. 60,452, 60,466-78 (Oct. 24, 2007) (codified as amended at 29 C.F.R.
§ 2550.404c-5 (2012)) (regulatory impact analysis).
203 See, e.g., OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: PROPOSED NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL EMISSIONS STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS
FOR THE OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnecasi

/regdata/RlAs/oilnaturalgasfinalria.pdf. See generally Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 859 (2oo) (empirically demonstrating wide variation across agencies in CBA
practices for economically significant rules).
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as opposed to quantitatively, and the number of alternatives they explicitly consider, among numerous other factors. 2 0 4
Given their discretion in selecting from this wide array of practices,
agencies can attempt to insulate their regulatory decisions through
CBA preparation in multiple ways. First, they can work to avoid the
designation of economic significance altogether and thus decrease the
amount of presidential scrutiny. Reports from former OIRA officials,
for example, suggest that agencies may avoid determinations of economic significance by splitting rules into parts, each of which falls beneath the $ioo million threshold. 205 So, for example, an economically
significant rule with an expected impact of $io million in a given
year could be split into two separate rules, each of which is expected to
cost $75 million in that year. Neither of these rules would now be designated as economically significant, thus effectively lowering the scrutiny of review. Similarly, agencies could choose discount rates that decrease the rule's expected costs or benefits or place greater weight on
particular cost-benefit studies in the literature that predict minimal
economic impacts, all in an attempt to remain under the threshold.
Alternatively, even if efforts to avoid a determination of economic
significance are unsuccessful, agencies can make choices regarding the
substance and form of a CBA that have self-insulating effects. 206 As
understood here, the substance of a CBA refers to the strength of the
data supporting the analysis and the conclusions drawn from it, while
its form goes to how an expert agency communicates the results of its
analysis to a more generalist audience. The two dimensions are certainly related, but they can be isolated. When preparing a CBA, an
agency faces separate resource decisions regarding how much to invest
in expertise when reaching its decisions, as well as how to present its
CBA at the point of presidential submission before the rule is publicly
released. Stated differently, it can make distinct choices regarding its
own private information and the information it presents to presidential
reviewers, subject, of course, to any exogenous data limitations.

204 See Hahn et al., supra note 203, at 865-77.

205 See DONALD R. ARBUCKLE, OIRA AND PRESIDENTIAL REGULATORY REVIEW

15

(2oo8) ("In some cases, agency officials divided potential major rules into two or more non-major
components, and in other cases they might argue that the estimated costs or benefits were under
the $oo million threshold . . . ."); Declaration of Richard B. Belzer, Ph.D., supra note 196, at 9
("During my tenure in OIRA, I often observed agencies attempt to split draft regulations into
smaller parts so as to avoid exceeding the $ioo million threshold for a 'major' or 'economically
significant' regulation, presumably in hopes of avoiding the requirements to prepare a Regulatory
Impact Analysis."); see also Note, supra note 22, at 1002.
206 Even if, as argued by Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1869, costs and benefits may not often be
"the key issue" during the review process, many of the claims here would also apply to the substance and presentation of other issues germane to review.
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Regarding the agency's own investment in research and expertise,20 7 the more an agency invests in such research, the more costly it
becomes for the President to contest the agency's decision. Competing
expertise from experts within the executive branch would now be necessary in order to engage the agency on its terms. 208 In other words,
the stronger the technical substance of the CBA, the more resourceintensive the review process required to engage with and dispute the
agency's findings. Reversal costs are also raised if the President decides instead to politicize the data by exerting pressure on the agency
head to alter or suppress the analysis. Not only does this require more
political capital by the President, but it also raises the risk that the
agency will informally release (or credibly threaten to release) its
underlying data to oversight bodies that can more readily check the
President. In this manner, an agency can effectively insulate through
expertise. 20 9
Even when an agency possesses the internal expertise to justify and
arrive at its regulatory decision, however, it still faces a distinct choice
regarding how to communicate and present this decision to
nonspecialists like the President - a process of translation from unstated assumptions to clearly stated ones, from jargon to plain English,
from the use of complex appendices to executive summaries, and so
on. That is, agencies can choose to initially submit an economically
significant rule accompanied by a poorly translated CBA, which requires higher reviewing costs, or a well-translated CBA, which requires
less. A well-translated CBA, as defined here, refers to analysis that
adheres to the best practices outlined in recent executive orders and
OIRA guidance documents, which generally promote principles of
clarity, consistency, and analytic rigor.2 10 In particular, OMB'S 2003
Circular A-4 provides that, in order to be a "good analysis," a CBA
must be a "transparent" one that states "what assumptions were used,
such as the time horizon for the analysis and the discount rates applied
to future benefits and costs," along with "a sensitivity analysis to reveal whether, and to what extent, the results of the analysis are sensi207 For a more detailed and nuanced discussion of this topic, see generally Matthew C.
Stephenson, Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. &

ORG. 469 (2007); Stephenson, supra note 63, at 1453-61.
208 See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1854-56.
209 See Jed Stiglitz, Choice of Policymaking Form: Judicial Competence and Agency Obfuscation 8-lo (Oct. 19, 20I2) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)
(exploring notion of insulation through expertise in the context of an independent agency, the
FCC, relative to judicial review).
210 See Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do
Benefit-Cost Analysis?, i REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL'VY 192, 195-96 (2007) (discussing various
methods for assessing the quality of regulatory analyses and concluding that scoring against criteria from executive orders and guidance documents was the best method).
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tive to plausible changes in the main assumptions and numeric inputs." 2 11 Producing a well-translated CBA, which lucidly presents the
analysis upon submission to the President, generally requires greater
investments of agency resources. 2 12
Rules with a well-translated CBA impose lower reviewing costs because they provide a greater amount of readily useable information
upon which to debate a policy decision within the executive branch.
More of the review time can be spent discussing the appropriate regulatory alternatives based on the information gained through CBA,
rather than attempting to clarify assumptions or extract data sources
from the agency through costly phone calls, meetings, and so on. Indeed, one important function of presidential review, as discussed, is
analytic: to convert poorly translated CBAs to well-translated ones, to
provide better information not only to the President, but also to other
political monitors in anticipation of the notice-and-comment process.
In this manner, agencies can effectively force more of the review to be
spent contesting the form rather than the substance of the CBA and, in
doing so, reduce the likelihood that the decision will be reversed on the
merits. 2 13
To illustrate, consider this account from a former OIRA official:
On the first level, we use common sense. If a reasonably intelligent
lay person is reading through the supporting documentation for the rule,
could he reach the same result? Is there a reasonably clear documentation
of the major effects? If we can't tell what is going on, we send it back.
We look for objectives, alternatives, costs, and benefits.
Occasionally, we have the luxury of getting into sophisticated issues,
such as calculating the discount rate and how sensitive the predictions are
to the discount rates. Unfortunately, we do not always have time for
2
this. 14

211 OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 77, at 3.
212 See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 39, at 8o-88 (describing a CBA's average decision costs

and noting that direct costs of an analysis hover around $i to 2 million). These decision costs can
include the "wages for agency staff involved in the preparation or review of such analyses, the
cost of information or computational resources used in analyses, overhead costs, [and the] fees for
analyses prepared by independent contractors." Id. at 80.
213 Of course, a CBA's form and substance can be related, as in the case when an agency's failure to discuss its rationale for choosing a regulatory option (weak form) results in a vulnerable
conclusion (weak substance); however, one can roughly distinguish between how costs and benefits are presented and the ultimate outcome chosen based on those costs and benefits.
214 THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 273-74 (1991) (emphasis added) (quoting a former

OIRA official, Thomas Hopkins). While this account predates President Clinton's executive order, there is little reason to believe that the same dynamic does not hold afterwards, if not even
more so given the new ninety-day time limit.
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For these reasons, the extent to which a poorly translated CBA can
be improved will be a function of the resources and time (usually ninety days) available to engage in the iterative process of (T) interagency
review; (2) comments, suggestions, and questions arising from that review and sent back to the agency; (3) further review of the resulting
revisions, if any; (4) further comments; and so on. A poorly translated
CBA will frequently result in the rule being sent back to the agency,
often more than once, with questions and comments designed to clarify
and sometimes contest the analytic basis.
As a result, agencies will often have an incentive to choose a poorly
translated CBA instead of a well-translated one at the point of presidential submission (though it may expect eventually to improve the
CBA by the time the review process is complete), since doing so will be
more likely to insulate the rule by increasing review costs. One Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) official, for example, has "candidly
observed" that "EPA has written many rules [the way that it has] because of a desire . . . to obfuscate in order to get the rules through the

regulatory and [OMB] approval process." 215
At the same time, the net effect of a poorly translated CBA on the
probability of reversal may well be ambiguous if the form of the CBA
also serves as a negative signal regarding the underlying substance.2 16
Reviewers could interpret a confusing CBA as an indication that the
substance of the rule is also poor, thus becoming more likely to reverse
it. One might similarly argue that when agencies have rules that are
substantively strong on the merits, they would have a cross-cutting incentive to submit a well-translated CBA to signal the rule's strength.
Both are compelling possibilities, but note that for reviewers even to
reach a conclusion on the merits, they would still have to spend time
and resources engaging with the agency in order to clarify the underlying CBA substance before contesting it. This epistemic disadvantage
results in higher resource costs at the margin and can thus yield insulating effects. 2 17 Regardless, because of these cross-cutting potential
dynamics, identifying which effects would ultimately dominate is ambiguous in theory and must thus be tested against available data. 2 18
215

Joel A. Mintz, "Neither the Best of Times nor the Worst of Times": EPA Enforcement Dur-

ing the Clinton Administration, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,390, 10,395 (2005) (first alteration in origi-

nal) (emphasis added).
216 See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of "HardLook" Judicial Review, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 766 (2006).

217 At the same time, agencies with substantively strong rules can still publicly release rules
with well-translated CBAs at the conclusion of the review process and would indeed have an incentive to do so for the sake of monitors and judicial review. Nevertheless, they would still benefit by making a different self-insulating choice at the initial point of presidential submission.
218 For a discussion of data sources and empirical investigation involving CBA quality, see infra
section II.B.2, pp. 18o6-io.
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This concept of poorly translated CBA as a self-insulation mechanism builds upon the work of others that have considered CBA as a
strategic means of acquiring information about a project's net value, 2 1 9
but now broadens the institutional lens to consider how a CBA's form
can also facilitate or hinder the review process itself. In doing so, it
distinguishes the more well-known incentives for agencies to augment
net benefits in order to increase a regulatory action's perceived value,
and turns instead to the ways in which a CBA's presentation at the
point of submission can impose higher or lower reviewing costs.
3. Timing Strategies. - In addition to choosing regulatory instruments designed to bypass review and calibrate its scrutiny, agencies
can also effectively truncate the time available for review, such that
the President will be able to review and reverse fewer decisions either
within or across rules. Recall that in response to criticism during previous administrations that "delay was OIRA's tactic of choice for stifling costly new regulations,"2 2 0 President Clinton's executive order
imposed a ninety-day cap subject to a thirty-day extension on the
amount of time available for review, 221 which itself could be extended
for "whatever length [the agency] deems appropriate."2 2 2 While the
Clinton Administration appears not to have enforced the deadlines
vigorously, accounts suggest that they were more strictly enforced beginning with President George W. Bush's OIRA Administrator, who
specifically instructed his staff "that no rule will stay longer than 90
days at OMB without my personal authorization." 2 2 3
The best way to understand this initial ninety-day clock is as a timing default rule: a presumption that review should be complete within
that period after which there are increased political costs for extending
the review. Those costs can be in the form of greater scrutiny from
outside interest groups,2 2 4 as well as congressional oversight hearings
219 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 2o, at 1154-62; Stephenson, supra note 207, at 47 1-83.
220 Bagley & Revesz, supra note io8, at 128o.
221 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(2)(B-C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 647 (1994), reprintedas amended in 5
U.S.C. § 6oi app. at 86-91 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011).
222 Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1847. Sunstein quotes the provision of the order providing that
"[t]he review process may be extended (i) once by no more than 30 calendar days upon the written
approval of the Director and (2) at the request of the agency head," id. at 1847 1-39 (quoting Exec.
Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(2)(C), 3 C.FR. 638 at 647) (internal quotation marks omitted), and notes
that it "might be taken to be ambiguous because of the use of the word 'and,"' id. However, he
states that "it has long been understood that the agency head may request an extension of any
length, including an indefinite one." Id.
223 GAO, REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 15, at 47 (internal quotation mark omitted).
The number of review periods lasting more than ninety days dropped significantly in the year of
this instruction, suggesting that it had noticeable effect. See id. at 46 fig.7.
224 See, e.g., White House Delays Whale Protection Rule, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE GOv'T
(July 24, 2007), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3366 (citing delay and related concerns that
"the Bush administration is giving special access to business interests and overemphasizing economic considerations in its review of the rule").
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or letters. 2 2 5 As a result, agencies can insulate themselves from political control by attempting to truncate the amount of time effectively
available for review. Managing that amount of time reduces the number of issues that can be raised and resolved during the process and
thereby increases the pressure for reviewers to prioritize some issues
and ignore others that might have otherwise been subject to reversal.
This dynamic is strongest in the context of rules with judicial and
statutory deadlines, though it also applies to other internal administration deadlines, such as announcements or high-profile events. Both
courts and Congress can impose deadlines on agency action, including
ones to commence or complete an action by a specified date.2 2 6 The
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984,227 for example, contained more than sixty statutory deadlines for the issuance of specific
regulations regarding the land disposal of hazardous waste. 2 2 8 As another example, the Defenders of Wildlife and the National Audubon
Society sued the Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service
in 2007, alleging the department's failure to implement an adequate
plan governing off-road vehicle use.22 9 In April 2008, the plaintiffs
agreed to a consent decree, which established a judicial deadline of
April I, 2011, for the final rule. 2 3 0 While agencies are able to comply
with only a fraction of these deadlines in practice, 2 3 1 such deadlines
can nonetheless be powerful motivations for expedited behavior.
A number of courts, in turn, have held that the presidential review
process cannot delay the promulgation of regulations subject to such

225 See, e.g., Letter from Sens. Frank R. Lautenberg & Sheldon Whitehouse to Cass Sunstein,
Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs i (Sept. 9, 2011), available at http://www.whitehouse
.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Lautenberg-Whitehouse%2 oLetter% 2 otO%2 oSunstein%2 0% 289-9

-II%29.pdf (asking OIRA Administrator to conclude review given that EPA's "proposed rule listing chemicals of concern" was sent to OIRA "nearly Soo days ago and well beyond the go days
authorized for OIRA review").
226 See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 923, 925 (2008).

227 Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
228 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2006); see also Alden F. Abbott & Gordon L. Brady, The PoliticalEconomy of Statutory Deadlines, 1o CATO J. 703, 704 n.I (igi).

229 See Special Regulations, Areas of the National Park System, Cape Hatteras National Sea§ 7.58 (2012)) (discussing lawsuit and judicial deadline).
230 Id. Numerous other examples of judicial deadlines abound. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health
Research Grp. v. Auchter, 702 F.2d ii5o, I18-59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration must propose a rule by April 15, 1983).
231 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Response, PresidentialControl Is Better than the Alternatives, 88
TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 113, 117 (20oo), http://www.texaslrev.com/wp-content/uploads/Pierce-88
-TLRSA-i 13.pdf ("[T]he EPA complies with only fifteen to twenty percent of the statutory provisions that require it to issue legislative rules within statutorily specified time periods.").
shore, 77 Fed. Reg. 3123, 3124 (Jan. 23, 2012) (Codified at 36 C.F.R.
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deadlines.2 32 In Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,2 33 for example, the district court ruled that "OMB has no authority to use its regulatory review . . . to delay promulgation .

.

. beyond the date of a statu-

tory deadline."2 3 4 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit found an Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) rule to be lawful despite
the fact that OMB still had objections at the time the final rule was
issued under a judicial deadline. 2 3 5 As a result, statutory and judicial
deadlines potentially "let the agencies 'game' OMB by holding rules
and analyses until the last minute" and, in effect, truncate the amount
of available review time. 23 6 In other words, agencies can wait to submit rules to OIRA less than ninety days before the applicable deadline,
thereby insulating various aspects of the rule.
Even in the absence of statutory or judicial deadlines, agencies
have other means with which to reduce effectively the amount of review time devoted to a given rule. For example, they could submit a
number of lengthy, economically significant rules all at once to the
same desk officer, thereby reducing the amount of time the desk officer
can devote to each rule. Some observers of the presidential review
process also describe a practice involving the addition of provisions to
draft rules as bargaining chips that "would be available" for agencies
"to give away" or negotiate during presidential (or later, judicial) review in order to protect what they perceive as the most important provisions of a rule. 23 7 If common or widespread, this practice would allow agencies to spend significant amounts of time during the review
negotiating provisions that distract from others that are, in reality,
more important to them.
4. Coalition Building. - Even if an agency is unable to bypass review, calibrate its scrutiny, or truncate the amount of time available, it
can still insulate its decisions by building coalitions with the multiple
232 Indeed, President Clinton's executive order explicitly states that "[n]othing in this order
shall be construed as displacing the agencies' authority or responsibilities, as authorized by law."
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 9, 3 C.F.R. 638, 649 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 6o app.
at 86-91 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011).
233 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986).
234 Id. at 571.
235 See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Lyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also In
re United Mine Workers of Am. Int'l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ("[T]he President
is without authority to set aside congressional legislation by executive order, and the 1993 executive order does not purport to do so.").
236 James C. Miller III, The Early Days of Reagan Regulatory Relief and Suggestions for OIRA's
Future, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 93, 99 (2011); see also Arthur Fraas, Observations on OIRA's Policies and Procedures, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. (SPECIAL EDITION) 79, 86-87
(2011) (discussing examples of rules that "flowed through OIRA 'lickety-split' quickly," id. at 86,
due to judicial or policy-directed deadlines).
237 E.g., Stuart Shapiro, The Role of ProceduralControls in OSHA's Ergonomics Rulemaking,
67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 688, 693 (2007).
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actors involved in the review process - career civil servants, other executive branch agencies, or the various entities within the Executive
Office of the President (EOP). This overall strategy would amount to
increasing the costs of review and reversal given that more resources
would need to be spent "mediating" the disagreements between more
actors or "elevating" the disagreements to increasingly higher levels of
decisionmakers. 2 3 8 Concretely, these resource costs could include the
staff time required to brief relevant policy officials, as well as the efforts required to plan, schedule, and attend meetings. At the same
time, of course, this strategy would also raise the agency's own decision and transaction costs and so will likely be engaged only when
most valuable.23 9 Accordingly, this section now relaxes the assumption
that the "President" is a singular entity to give way to a more nuanced
consideration of the President and his multiple agents. 240
The EOP manifests the "institutional response" to the President's
need for various monitors to gather information about a vast bureaucracy. 2 4 1 First established by executive order in 1939, the original Executive Office consisted of the White House Office, OMB, the National Resources Planning Board, the Office of Government Reports, and "such
office for emergency management as the President shall determine." 2 42
The number and nature of entities within the EOP has evolved over the
years, but some of the most enduring include: the White House Office
(containing, for example, the Domestic Policy Council 2 43 and the National Economic Council 24 4 ); OMB; the Council of Economic Advisers;
the National Security Council; the Council on Environmental Quality;
and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative.2 45
(a) Career Staff. - Of these entities, the largest is OMB, which
consists of a number of offices, including OIRA, several "resource
management offices" that evaluate and review budget requests, and

238 See Sunstein,

supra note 27, at 1856-58.
239 See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1181-83 (2012).
240 See Kagan, supra note 37, at 2338-39; Moe & Wilson, supra note 49, at 14.
241 See MATTHEW J. DICKINSON, BITTER HARVEST. FDR, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND
THE GROWTH OF THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH 117 (1997); HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., 98-606 GOV, THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW I (2oo8).
242 Exec. Order No. 8248, 3 C.F.R. 576 (1938-1943).
243 See Exec. Order No. 12,859, 3 C.F.R. 628 (1994) (establishing Domestic Policy Council).
244 See Exec. Order No. 12,835, 3 C.F.R. 586 (1994) (establishing National Economic Council).
245 See RELYEA, supra note 241, at 9-io; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 239, at 1176-78. For a
more complete list of current EOP offices with brief descriptions, see Executive Office of the President, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop (last visited Mar. 30, 2013)
(describing EOP components).
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others as well.2 4 6 OMB differs from most other units within the EOP
in that it has a staff consisting primarily of career civil servants. 2 4 7 As
such, it can offer assistance and advice to the President from expertise
gained through institutional memory and experience. Within OIRA,
the Administrator is appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, and in addition to other possible members of its political leadership, there are also about forty to fifty career staff, as well as a Deputy Administrator, who serves as the senior career manager. 248 Of this
already small staff, only about twenty to thirty consistently engage in
regulatory review. They include "desk officer[s]" and their supervisors,
"branch chief[s]" who oversee portfolios of agencies and substantive

policy areas. 24 9
Many desk officers have been at OIRA for many years, though
some depart after only a few. Some of the more senior career staff, including the branch chiefs, are also veterans of several administrations
and thus possess institutional knowledge and experience. 2 50 The same
is true of the resource management offices with whom OIRA "may
work closely." 2 5 1 As a result, many of the career staff have developed
productive and longstanding professional relationships with other career staff at the rulemaking agencies. These relationships are likely
mutually beneficial for facilitating their repeated transactions and for
amicably resolving difficult and often technical issues. 2 5 2 Because of
these relationships and longer time horizons, however, there is an incentive for agency career staff to insulate their decisions by resolving
issues with other career staff (whether at other agencies involved in interagency review or at OMB), rather than allowing the issues to be

246 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 239, at 1178; The Mission and Structure of the Office of
Management and Budget, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission
(last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
247 See ARBUCKLE, supra note 205, at 25; TOMKIN, supra note 57, at 3.
248 See ARBUCKLE, supra note 205, at 9 n.23; Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1845. The titles and

composition of OIRA's political leadership can vary from administration to administration.
Compare GAO, REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note IS, at Ig fig.2 (displaying OIRA organizational chart for one point during the George W. Bush Administration), with Sunstein, supra
note 27, at 1845 (discussing OIRA political leadership during the Obama Administration).
249 ARBUCKLE, supra note 205, at 22; Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1845.
250 See West, supra note 62, at 84 ("Although a significant percentage of the desk officers who
initially review rules leave after a few years .. ., most of the senior civil servants who are the
keepers of OIRA's professional norms and sense of mission are veterans of several presidencies.").
251 Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1845.

252 See id. at 1847 ("Sometimes, of course, OIRA will have significant suggestions of its own,
stemming in the first instance from OIRA staff, and will convey its views to the agency... [Changes] are often highly technical or procedural ones, and made without any involvement on the part of OIRA's political leadership.").
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subject to the political, and thus more uncertain, scrutiny of high-level

decisionmakers. 2 5 3
The decision whether to elevate an issue to higher-level
decisionmakers will likely depend on the respective staff members'
senses of the political dynamics and whether their arguments might
prevail during the resulting negotiations. In the words of one OIRA
desk officer: "It's embarrassing to raise something up and to get
knocked down .

..

. So people specifically think about that question,

and try to anticipate whether they're going to get [political] support or
not. And if you don't think you are, you don't waste the person's time

a lot of the times." 2 5 4
Because they have been working together for longer periods of
time, agency career staff may prefer to resolve issues with other staff
members they know, and whose viewpoints may thus be more familiar.
The threat of elevation can in this manner serve as a stick. While the
potential for preference divergence between civil servants and political
appointees is well known,2 5 5 even when preferences are aligned, agencies still save resources by resolving issues at the staff level. Of course,
when an agency thinks it is more likely to get support from a higherlevel decisionmaker, this incentive is reduced and elevation is preferable, despite the greater resource costs.
(b) White House Offices and Other Executive Agencies. - The literature is rife with misleading references to "OIRA review," as if to
suggest that OIRA is the only office engaging in the review process. 2 5 6
But presidential review is not bilateral; rather, it involves multiple actors and reviewers of which OIRA is but one, though it does serve a
central, coordinating function - what Professor and former OIRA
Administrator Cass Sunstein refers to as that of a "convener" or "facilitator."2 57 After an agency submits a rule for review, "the relevant
253 See MCGARITY, supra note 214, at 280 (reporting that, in the past, "the regulatory analysts
in the Office of Policy Analysis of EPA have used OMB review as an opportunity to wage anew
battles that they lost internally" and that "OMB analysts frequently telephone the lead analysts in
EPA for a different view of EPA regulations, and they can use the insights gained from those conversations in OMB's future discussions with EPA program office staff and with upper-level
decisionmakers").
254 David Lazer, Regulatory Review: Presidential Control Through Selective Communication
and InstitutionalConflict 122 (Ctr. for Pub. Leadership Working Paper Series, No. 03-04, 2003)
(first alteration in original), available at http://hdl.handle.net/I72I.I/55802 (reporting on and analyzing interviews with OIRA staff).
255 See, e.g., Clinton et al., supra note 5S, at 352 ("[O]ur estimates confirm that the preferences
of career professionals differ from political appointees."). See generally ROBERT MARANTO,
BEYOND A GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS (2005).

256 See, e.g., Michael D. Sant'Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-AgentApproach Can
Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging,79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1381, 1424 (201I) ("[T]hrough the OIRA review process, the President has a powerful tool for

identifying and addressing unreasonable delays in agency actions.").
257 Sunstein, supra note 27, at

1856.
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OIRA desk officer ... will generally circulate the rule to a wide range
of offices and departments, both within the Executive Office of the
President and outside of it."258 The decision regarding which offices
should see the rule will likely depend on a number of factors, including
whether the office is perceived to have relevant information and expertise 2 5 9 or has otherwise expressed an interest in the rule. These EOP
entities often include "the Council of Economic Advisers, the Council
on Environmental Quality, the Domestic Policy Council, the National
Economic Council, the National Security Council, the Office of Legislative Affairs, the [OMB], the Office of Science and Technology Policy,
the Office of the Vice President, the U.S. Trade Representative, and
the White House Counsel."2 6 0
In this manner, any number of other agencies and EOP entities,
from only a few to many, could be involved in the review of a rule, depending on the political visibility and substance of the regulation at
stake. As they receive comments and questions back from these reviewers, OIRA staff will often add their own before transmitting the
comments back to the agency.2 6 1 OIRA then coordinates a process
whereby it attempts to help refine and resolve arising issues through
multiple rounds of comments and questions, followed by possible revisions and responses by the agency. During this process, the more the
rulemaking agency has successfully built coalitions with other commenting entities, the more likely it is to insulate its decisions from reversal as the issue is discussed or elevated since the review costs are
now higher (there must be more meetings, briefings, and coordination
among a now greater number of actors). 2 6 2
To illustrate, consider Professors Lisa Bressman and Michael
Vandenbergh's empirical study relying on interviews with EPA senior
political officials. They report that during the George H.W. Bush and
Clinton Administrations, "[a]s many as nineteen White House offices
were involved in EPA rule-making." 263 Often, these White House offices fostered a "climate of internal combat and coalition-building" and
258 Id. at 1854; see also GAO, REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 15, at 34.

259 Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1854-57 (listing frequent rule recipients).
260 Id. at 18s.

261 Id. at 1856. For a more detailed overview of the process, see id. at 1854-59.
262 The normative value of self-insulation through coalition building is ambiguous in that it
will depend on the nature of the particular coalition. On the one hand, coalition building with
other informed and expert entities within the executive branch is likely to be constructive and will
result in a better-informed decision, and thus a stronger rule. On the other hand, if agencies manage to build coalitions with entities that do not necessarily have better expertise, or that simply
have higher status in the decisional EOP hierarchy, then self-insulation in these circumstances is
less clear and may depend on the nature of the authorizing statute. For a more general discussion
of the normative tradeoffs, see Freeman & Rossi, supra note 239, at 1I81--1. See also infra section III.B, pp. 1822-34.
263 Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 68.

2013]

AGENCY SELF-INSULATION

1803

"competed for influence over the content of . . . proposed rules, enlist-

ing other offices, the vice president, and even the president himself to
mediate the disputes."2 64 EPA survey respondents reported that they
sometimes turned to other White House offices to bolster opposition to
OIRA, and other offices and agencies made use of OIRA to combat the
EPA.2 65 At other times, OIRA and the EPA could be allies against
other offices and agencies.2 66 One commentator noted that "[n]ormal
constituency groups" such as the Council on Environmental Quality
and the Vice President often took the EPA's side when disagreements
arose with other agencies, such as the Department of Energy.2 67
Should disagreement among reviewers persist, Executive Order
12,866's conflict-resolution mechanism provides that "disagreements or
conflicts between or among agency heads or between OMB and any
agency . . . shall be resolved by the President, or by the Vice President

acting at the request of the President." 2 68 In practice, however, most
disagreements are resolved well before the issue is elevated to the presidential level. 2 6 9 In this manner, the self-insulating agency can work
during the review process to garner support for a policy decision from
particular reviewers that might hold sway in the White House. When
successful, such coalition-building efforts will raise the cost of review
by increasing the amount of capital necessary to reverse the agency, as
well as the time and resources necessary to resolve disputes. 2 7 0
B. Applications
While agencies can choose among regulatory instruments that vary
in terms of their policy impacts and the amount of information available for review, the question of whether to self-insulate in the first place
will itself depend on a number of factors.2 71 As presented here, an im264 Id.
265 Id. at 69.
266 See id.
267 Id. at 68 (internal quotation mark omitted).
268 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 7, 3 C.F.R. 638, 648 (1994), reprinted as amended in
§ 6oi app. at 86-91 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011).

5 U.S.C.

269 See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1857 ("In relatively rare cases, discussion at the Assistant
Secretary level does not resolve the issue . . . ."); see also John Spotila, Presidential Oversight: A
Panel Discussion with Regulatory "Czars" from Reagan to Bush 14 (Dec. 6, 2oo6) (transcript
available at https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/regulation/conferences/OIRAPanelTranscript
.pdf) ("During my tenure [as OIRA Administrator from 1999 to 2000], in many of the issues that
went higher it was really the Chief of Staff that ultimately brokered the decision process - and,
to the extent necessary, spoke to the President about it.").
270 Cf Freeman & Rossi, supra note 239, at 1181-82 (discussing how "costs tend to rise with the
burdensomeness of [review]," especially where "extensive negotiations" and "significant staff time
and resources" are involved, id. at i 182).
271 The agency's decision costs and the President's choice of reversal instrument will also be
relevant; regarding the latter, in practice return letters are infrequent, and the most common reversals are probably changes made within rules, or else agency withdrawal.

1804

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 126:1755

portant factor is the probability of the potential preference divergence
between the agency and the President. That is, holding resources constant, agencies will be more likely to self-insulate the greater the
chance that the President will have different preferences, thus resulting
in likely reversal. By contrast, if it expects the President to agree with
its decisions, then the agency will be less likely to self-insulate. In
technical terms, an agency will be more likely to choose an instrument
likely to raise reviewing costs the greater the distance between the
agency and the President's expected ideal points.2 72
With these dynamics in mind, this section now considers some potential applications of the framework developed. Generally speaking,
the theory bears on the agency's choices at the point at which it submits a regulatory action for review, as a function of changes in expected preference divergence and decision costs. 2 7 3 Insofar as this discussion marshals the decidedly mixed existing evidence, it does so only
to illustrate the plausibility of the hypotheses generated. Further empirical work would be necessary to test whether the theory of selfinsulation can explain systematically the variations in agency behavior.
The modest hope here is to point in some potentially fruitful directions, as further data become available. Note that such future work
could, for example, use the independent regulatory agencies as a control group, given that they are not subject to the formal presidential
review process.2 7 4 It might also consider how to account for the potentially offsetting effects of greater politicization through appointments,
and other related efforts to counter agency slack.2 7 5
272

See Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 361; see also Posner, supra note 2o, at 1150-58.

273 More specifically, the main dependent variables for agency self-insulation might include

counts of various policymaking forms, scorecard measures of CBA quality, and variations in rule
submission dates relative to statutory and judicial deadlines. Coalition-building efforts may be
more difficult to analyze on a large-scale empirical level, particularly given the lack of access to
executive branch deliberations; in this context, in-depth case studies and first-person accounts
may prove more useful to better understanding this dynamic. The main independent variables, in
turn, might include party affiliation of the administration or various policy-preference measures
of individual agencies. See, e.g., Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, Agency
Characteristics,and Agency Preferences, 16 POL. ANALYSIS 3, 4 (2oo8) (proposing method for
measuring agency preferences based on expert surveys and a "multirater item response model to
jointly analyze the responses and objective information about agency characteristics").
274 See Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 7(a), 3 C.F.R. 215, 217 (2012), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. § 6oi app. at 101-02 (2006 & Supp. V 2011); Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3 (b), 3 C.F.R. 638,
641 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 6ol app. at 86-91 (defining "agency" for purposes
of presidential review as that provided for in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(I), and excluding "independent
regulatory agencies" as defined in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(io), both provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. H§ 3502-3520 (2006)).
275 See Moe & Wilson, supra note 49, at 18-19. Note that, dynamically speaking, changes in
appointments and personnel are often much slower to occur relative to changes in the various policy decisions contained in rules. For this reason, while specific review efforts and politicization
through appointments could be substitutes, they will ultimately be imperfect substitutes such that
one would still expect the self-insulation effect to be observable. Aggregate data also suggest that,
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i. Midnight Rulemaking. - One scenario in which agencies are
better able to predict presidential preferences, relative to the status
quo, is after the next President has been elected, a situation ripe for
"midnight rulemaking." Midnight rulemaking is the frenetic promulgation of regulations during the last ninety days of a presidential administration and is particularly common when the incoming President
is from a different party.27 6 In these circumstances, executive agencies
can expect more preference alignment during review from the current
administration relative to the next one; thus, one would expect to see
less self-insulation in these situations.
Some empirical findings support this prediction. One study, for example, analyzes agency regulatory activity during midnight periods
from February 1981 through January 2009.277 First, it finds a statistically significant increase in the total number of economically significant regulations submitted to OIRA during midnight periods relative
to non-midnight periods. Specifically, the average monthly number of
economically significant rules rose by about six, roughly a fifty percent
increase from the average monthly quantity during the entire period.2 78
Other studies also show that agencies issue rules with the most "highly
visible" costs during midnight periods. 279 These results are consistent
with the notion that agencies will choose to submit more economically
significant rules over other instruments, such as nonsignificant rules,
under conditions of expected preference alignment. That is, agencies
will be less likely to self-insulate through instrument choice as the risks
of presidential reversal decrease relative to the next administration. 2 8 0

since 1980, the number of political appointees has remained fairly constant as a percentage of federal government appointees, which may further help to mitigate the potential confounding effects
of variations in political appointments. See LEWIS, supra note 5o, at 98-oo.
276 See O'Connell, supra note 7, at 891-92, 894 n.Ii; see also Jack M. Beermann, Midnight
Rules: A Reform Agenda, MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstractid=2121796 (defining "Midnight
Rules as agency rules promulgated in the last go days of an administration').
277 See Patrick A. McLaughlin, The Consequences of Midnight Regulations and Other Surges
in Regulatory Activity, 147 PUB. CHOICE 395, 398 (2011).
278 Id. at 405.
279 E.g., Stuart Shapiro & John F. Morrall III, The Triumph of Regulatory Politics:Benefit-Cost
Analysis and Political Salience, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE i8g, 198 (2012) ("Non-midnight regulations do have higher benefits and lower costs, which supports the point often made, that administrations wait until the last minute to get out the rules most likely to have potential negative electoral consequences (rules with highly visible costs).").
280 Of course, in addition to the agency's supply of rules, one must also take into account the
President's demand for them; during these periods, that is, it is also highly likely that outgoing
EOP entities will be attempting to spur certain kinds of regulatory action in anticipation of their
departure. See Beermann, supra note 276, at 6 (noting the argument that midnight rulemaking
could reflect an "outgoing administration" that is "projecting its agenda into the future"). For a
discussion of how EOP offices can "prompt" regulatory actions, see Sunstein, supra note 27, at
1849-50.
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This choice not to self-insulate is likely aided by a White House eager
to release the rules or otherwise "burrow" its policies before the change

in power. 281
One would also expect this dynamic to hold with respect to an
agency's choice between significant rules and guidance documents.
When the current President is perceived as more of an ally than the
incoming one, an agency will shift away from self-insulation as a strategy by choosing rulemaking over guidance documents, which are more
difficult to review. One empirical investigation examines the ratio of
the number of guidance documents to the number of legislative rules
issued from 1996 to 2006 for five representative agencies: the EPA, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), OSHA, and the Internal Revenue Service. 28 2
While a more precise test of self-insulation would compare the number
of guidance documents to the number of submitted (rather than issued)
rules, 283 this analysis finds that agencies increase the frequency with
which they issue guidance documents relative to rules during the first
three years of a presidential administration, with the ratio decreasing
afterwards. 2 84 This finding could be consistent with the self-insulation
hypothesis, since closer and more certain preference alignment with
the current administration (relative to the next) should decrease the incentive to insulate through guidance documents versus rules. At the
same time, however, the study's data are limited and the author concludes that nonstrategic factors, such as the agency's desire to reduce
compliance costs through greater clarity, may better explain the agency's choice. 2 8 5 For these reasons, future work should extend this dataset and continue to build upon these valuable empirical efforts.
2.
Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis Quality. - As expected
presidential preferences vary across different administrations, one
would also expect to see variations in the quality and form of submitted CBAs. A simple theory would be that, for a President with an antiregulatory stance, an agency would have a greater incentive to provide a poorly translated CBA, since doing so would increase the costs
281 See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel
Before a New PresidentArrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557 (2003).
282 See Raso, supra note 64. Of course, the FCC, as an independent regulatory agency, is not

subject to presidential review - but the data here are presented in the aggregate, and the FCC
alone is unlikely to change the direction of the empirical findings, though future work could separate it out from the rest of the dataset.
283 The number of rules actually issued by the agency would be an imperfect proxy for agency
efforts to self-insulate, since self-insulation implicates agency behavior at the point of presidential
submission. Furthermore, counting the number of issued rules would also reflect the President's
decisions about which rules to allow to be released, though the number could serve as a rough
indicator of agency choice between policymaking forms.
284 Raso, supra note 164, at 821-22.
285 See id. at 802.
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of review and facilitate self-insulation through obfuscation. 2 8 6 Conversely, under a proregulatory administration, a higher-quality CBA
might become a more attractive instrument, since the probability of
reversal would generally be lower, leading the executive agency to
worry less about presidential review than about judicial review (an exogenous factor that would encourage the submission of better CBAs,

as later discussed).2 8 7

Shedding possible light upon this prediction, Robert Hahn and
Patrick Dudley's study scores the CBA quality of seventy-four economically significant EPA rules published from 1982 to 1999: twentyseven from the Reagan Administration, twenty-four from the George
H.W. Bush Administration, and twenty-three from the Clinton Administration. 288 More specifically, Hahn and Dudley examine various indicia of quality, such as whether the analysis includes estimates of
monetized costs and benefits and a consideration of alternatives, along
with the overall clarity of presentation and the specification of analytical assumptions. 2 8 9 While their general conclusion is that there is "no
clear trend in the quality of benefit-cost analysis across administrations," 2 90 a look at some of the disaggregated factors may help to reveal more specific avenues of self-insulation.
For example, Hahn and Dudley examine whether the analyses contain a point estimate or a range for total expected costs. 2 91 A point estimate is presented as a single number, while a range estimate includes
two points bounding a significant portion of the confidence interval.
Both sets of data give political principals important information about
key components of the expected impacts of a regulation. 292 The authors find that, under the Reagan Administration, fifteen percent of
the CBAs provided neither a point estimate nor a range for total
costs. 2 9 3 This figure was seventeen percent during the Bush Administration, dropping down to four percent under President Clinton. 294
In other words, the EPA was more likely to provide a CBA that contained less useful information about costs during a Republican administration than during a Democratic administration. Given that the
traditionally proregulatory EPA's preferences were likely to diverge
286 For a discussion of the complex potential relationship between CBA quality and reversal
probability, see supra section II.A. 3 , pp. 796-98.
287 For a discussion about judicial review's potential effects on CBA quality, see infra section
IIC, pp. 1811-13.
288 See Hahn & Dudley, supra note 2 0, at 197.
289

Id. at

198, 204-05.

290 Id. at 206.
291 See id. at 199.
292 See id.
293
294

Id.
Id.
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from those of the more antiregulatory Republican Presidents, one hypothesis is that the EPA was more likely to engage in self-insulation by
decreasing CBA quality. Conversely, when there was more expected
preference alignment under President Clinton, this self-insulating behavior was less likely to occur, resulting in higher-quality CBAs. 2 9 5
In a more recent paper, Professor Stuart Shapiro and John Morrall
examine a database of log economically significant rules issued between 2000 and 2oo9. They construct a six-point quality index for the
accompanying CBA based on a number of factors related to the analyses' "thoroughness." 2 9 6 Upon comparing the quality scores with the
net benefits of the rules, they observe that "rules that most barely clear
the net benefit threshold had the least useful analyses supporting
them."2 97 Shapiro and Morrall hypothesize that one explanation for
this result could be that "for rules that are close to this threshold, agencies may be under pressure to make sure the analysis shows positive net
benefits. This pressure may result in a less thorough . . . analysis." 298
In other words, "having low net benefits leads to analysis that omits
critical factors." 299 Assuming that Presidents would be more likely to
reject rules with small net benefits, this finding would be consistent
with the notion that agencies attempt to self-insulate by decreasing the
quality of CBAs for rules with low net benefits.
However, Shapiro and Morrall also find that average CBA quality
was greater for rules with negative net benefits than for rules with
positive net benefits below $i billion.a00 This finding would not support the self-insulation hypothesis since agencies would presumably
seek to shield those rules. More research would thus be necessary to
determine whether other explanatory factors, such as exogenous statu-

295 Of course, this hypothesis should not be overstated; there are other possible explanations for
this divergence between administrations, such as an agency's greater experience with, and thus
improvement in, preparing CBAs. The study also finds that point estimates of total costs were
more common than ranges during the Reagan and Clinton administrations. By contrast, point
estimates were just as common as ranges during the Bush administration, while few analyses provided both a point estimate and range during any administration. Id. Though the usefulness of
point estimates versus ranges is likely to vary depending on the issue, the underlying uncertainties, and the magnitude of the range, these findings suggest that, at a minimum, further research
in this area could be valuable.
296 See Shapiro & Morrall, supra note 279, at 195-96.
297 Id. at 197.
298 Id. at 197-98.

299 Id. at 198. The authors call this notion "problematic," id., because one of their hypotheses is
that CBA quality "may generate regulations that produce greater net benefits," id. at 190. The
theory of self-insulation, however, provides a contrary account.
300 See id. at 197 tbl.2. More specifically, they find that rules with negative net benefits had an
average quality score of 3.95 out of a possible 6; rules with net benefits between $o and $ioo million had a score of 3.o3; rules with net benefits between $ioo million and $i billion had a score of
3.79; and finally, rules with net benefits over $i billion had an average score of 4.04. Id.
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tory constraints3 0 or a higher likelihood of litigation for negative netbenefit rules, may have created a cross-cutting incentive to improve
CBA quality in anticipation of judicial review. 30 2 If not, then this finding would counsel in favor of rejecting the self-insulation theory, or at
least concluding that it is not the dominant effect.
Note that one difficulty with this line of research in general is that
simply scoring an agency's published CBA does not allow one to disentangle how much of its quality reflects agency self-insulation at the
point of submission and how much reflects presidential reviewers' differential efforts to spend resources in an attempt to improve its quality.
In other words, while agency self-insulation refers to the supply of
CBAs, there may be important countervailing considerations on the
demand side as well, which will be reflected in the ultimately published analysis.30 3 To illustrate, consider another recent study, which
scores the CBA of economically significant regulations in 2oo8, 2009,
and 2010. The authors find, among other things, that "conservative
agencies" had higher-quality CBAs under the first Obama Administration, while more "liberal agencies" exhibited the same tendency under
President George W. Bush. 304
While the study uses only three years of data, thus limiting the generality of its conclusions, these findings on their face contradict the notion that self-insulation by itself explains the relevant variation, since
one would expect exactly the opposite dynamic. The authors explain
their results by reference to the differential demands likely during
presidential review. In their words:
This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that an administration
demands less thorough analysis from agencies whose underlying policy
views are more congruent with the administration's. Conversely, an agency whose policy preferences differ from the administration's must produce
better analysis to get its regulations through.305
This dynamic is indeed a critical one, though it is important to remember that agencies often have more control over CBA quality as the

first mover, given the limited time and resources available for review.

301 See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1865 & n.94 (citing the "'positive train control' rule, which
requires certain technology to be placed on trains" and explaining that "even if the rule does not
have net benefits,... agencies may have plausible explanations," such as that "the law requires
them to proceed even if the monetized benefits are lower than the monetized costs").
302 See infra section HG, pp. 1811-13.
303 See Acs & Cameron, supra note 24, at 22-28.
304 See Jerry Ellig, Patrick A. McLaughlin & John

F. Morrall III, Continuity, Change, and Priorities: The Quality and Use of Regulatory Analysis Across US Administrations, REG. & GovERNANCE (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 14), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi
8

/I0.IIII/j.174 -5991.2012.01149.x/abstract.

305 Id.
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In any case, because of these potential demand-side dynamics, the
best measure for testing the self-insulation theory would be the CBA
quality when the analyses were submitted to OIRA, as opposed to after they had undergone presidential review and been published. This
evaluation would be possible if agencies released their submission
drafts or specified the changes made as a result of presidential review,
as required by current executive orders; however, this is not frequently
done as a matter of practice. 3 0 6 Confronted with this paucity of data,
one could plausibly assume (if resources were relatively fixed throughout the relevant period) that the substance of the review remained fairly systematic and that the overall quality of the published CBA could
thus serve as a rough proxy for agency effort. But this assumption
may ultimately prove heroic, perhaps further supporting arguments for
changes in agency disclosure practices.
3. Strategic Timing. - Finally, as expected presidential preferences
vary across different administrations, one would also expect to see variations in the degree to which agencies exploit statutory or judicial
deadlines in attempts to truncate the amount of review time. Specifically, as agencies expect a greater probability of reversal, they would
be more likely to submit rules closer to external deadlines, effectively
allowing less review time than the default ninety days provided by executive order. Recent empirical work provides some support for these
predicted dynamics. One such study, for instance, examines all economically significant regulations proposed in 2008 and finds that statutory deadlines led to considerably shorter presidential review times. 307
The magnitude of diminished review was substantial, ranging from
thirty-eight percent to ninety percent less review time.3 0 In line with
these findings, the paper also reports that statutory deadlines result in
lower-quality CBAs. After scoring such analyses, the authors find that
regulations with statutory deadlines had a mean quality value of 22.1
points versus 27.3 points for the entire sample.3 09
On the one hand, these findings suggest that agencies faced with
statutory deadlines are likely to allow less time for review based on
when they submit their rules to OIRA. They also suggest that the
quality of the CBAs suffers as a result. Even if a deadline extends beyond the review window, it reduces the threat that OIRA could return
the regulation because the agency is legislatively or judicially mandated to issue it. In this manner, "statutory deadlines could undermine
306 See infra notes 372-373 and accompanying text.
307 See Patrick A. McLaughlin & Jerry Ellig, Does OIRA Review Improve the Quality of Regu-

latory Impact Analysis? Evidence from the Final Year of the Bush II Administration, 63 ADMIN.
L. REV (SPECIAL EDITION) 179, 1g-96 (2011).
308 Id. at 196.
309 Id. at 197.
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the prospects for effective OIRA review."310 On the other hand, a
competing explanation could be that agencies operating under tight
deadlines are working as fast as possible and submit their rules without allowing the full ninety days for review out of necessity, rather
than strategically. The answer is ultimately an empirical question with
the expected incentive to self-insulate becoming greater as the prospect
of preference divergence becomes more likely.3 1'
C. Mitigating Factors
Agency self-insulation consists of agencies' strategic choices amidst
resource constraints to raise reviewing costs in the face of expected
preference divergence. Identifying and exploring this phenomenon has
been the main task of this Article. To provide a more complete account, however, this section now considers some potential mitigating
factors, that is, some dynamics that may cut against the observable effects of self-insulation. 3 12 In other words, what other variables are
likely to influence agency behavior that may reduce the incentive to
self-insulate?
First, while the review process itself is costly and threatens costly
reversals, agencies may also perceive benefits from it that will decrease
their insulation incentive. Such benefits could include obtaining greater information and expertise from other executive branch entities,3 13 as
well as political support from a White House eager to "showcase and
advance presidential policies." 3 14 Indeed, one way to think about presidential review is as a kind of ninety-day executive branch notice-andcomment process. As previously discussed, once an agency submits a
draft rule to OIRA, the OIRA desk officer circulates the draft to other
agencies and White House offices that she perceives may have a stake
in or expertise related to the rule. OIRA then compiles the comments
that it receives from these reviewers for the agency's consideration and
response. The agency's response is then sent back to the reviewers,
and after several rounds (or however many rounds time allows for) the
Gersen & O'Connell, supra note 226, at )68.
One way to evaluate these rival explanations would be to examine when the statutes with
deadlines were passed (thus giving the agency notice of the deadlines), how long the statute then
granted the agency to act, and what proportion of this time period was allowed for presidential
review before the deadline, based on the agency's submission. The lower the proportion of review
time to the amount of time the agency had to prepare the rule, the higher the likelihood of strategic behavior.
312 These factors could appear in the error term of models exploring the relationship between
the variables identified here. See generally Damien Fennell, The Error Term and Its Interpreta310
311

tion in Structural Models in Econometrics, in CAUSALITY IN THE SCIENCES 361 (Phyllis
McKay Illari et al. eds., 2011).
313 See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1840-41, 1855-57.
314 Kagan, supra note 37, at 2248.
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issues are slowly resolved and whittled down through some combination of calls, memos, and meetings.
In this sense, the process helps to foster an "interagency dialogue"
and to identify those issues potentially worthy of elevation to higherlevel officials. 315 Accordingly, it can serve as a useful informationforcing mechanism for agencies from various executive branch vantage
points on a variety of substantive issues; it can also help agencies anticipate the procedural and legal issues likely to arise during a proposed rule's notice-and-comment process or in litigation over a final
rule. 3 1 6 The process can also provide agencies with "cover" for their
initiatives in the form of White House support for dealing with their
constituencies and critics. Undergoing review can similarly help agencies consider various political sensitivities and prepare for reactions
from outside groups. 3 17
Furthermore, the review process can be valuable for improving the
quality of an agency's CBA either through technical assistance or by
helping to consider various alternatives. Indeed, President Clinton's
executive order explicitly characterizes OIRA as a "repository of expertise concerning regulatory issues"3 18 and charges it with providing
"meaningful guidance and oversight."3 1 9 Numerous judicial developments have likely augmented the incentive for agencies to raise the
quality of their CBAs, the most important of which is the D.C. Circuit's formulation of "hard look" review, which was eventually adopted
by the Supreme Court in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Ass'n v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.32 0 According to the State
Farm Court, "the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.' 32 1 Though
rulemakings survive hard look review more often than not, 32 2 courts
have sometimes found agency CBAs lacking under the standard. 32 3
See Pildes & Sunstein, supra note go, at 14.
Shapiro, supra note 84, at 10,442-44; Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1840 (describing OIRA as,
"in large part, an information-aggregator").
317 See Kagan, supra note 37, at 2249 (describing how President Clinton "personally appropriated significant regulatory action through communicative strategies that presented regulations
and other agency work product, to both the public and other governmental actors, as his own").
318 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 2(b), 3 C.FR 638, 640 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 6ox app. at 86-91 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
319 Id. § 6(b), 3 C.F.R. at 646.
315

316

320 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
321 Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 37 1 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).

322 See William S. Jordan m, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV 393, 396 (2000).
323 In the well-known case Corrosion ProofFittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1230 (5th Cir. 1991),
for example, the Fifth Circuit vacated an EPA rule banning the manufacture and distribution of
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The judicial development of "cost-benefit default principles" has only
reinforced these dynamics.32 4 These analyses can be improved and
vetted through a robust presidential-review process, thereby potentially decreasing the incentives for self-insulation, particularly for those
rules that the agency expects to be challenged in court.
A final factor likely to inform the agency's decision whether to selfinsulate will be the amount of discretion available under the statute to
engage in the regulatory action in the first place. Rules can result
from statutory requirements that impose affirmative duties on agencies
to enact a regulation, or they can arise from other sources, such as "issues identified through external sources (for example, public hearings
or petitions from the regulated community) or internal sources (for example, management agendas)." 325 That is, rules can be required or
simply authorized by relevant legislation; they can be nondiscretionary
or discretionary. Nondiscretionary regulatory actions present situations in which the agency's preferences will be more closely aligned
with those of the President for the simple reason that both actors are
constrained by statute. Under these circumstances, an agency's incentives to self-insulate will be lower. On the other hand, discretionary
regulations are much more likely to face resistance from the President
if preferences diverge; thus, the incentive to insulate is higher.
III. IMPLICATIONS

A. President
From the President's perspective, agency self-insulation is disconcerting because many of the strategies, such as preventing significance
determinations or obfuscating costs, serve only to exacerbate the information asymmetries that presidential review seeks to mitigate in the
asbestos products, citing a deficient CBA. The panel found that the EPA had failed to adequately
consider alternatives to its ban and also expressed "concern[] about some of the methodology employed by the EPA," id. at 1218, including its insufficient attention to discounting, unquantified
benefits, and exposure estimates, id. at 1218-19. The court further characterized the EPA's consideration of the costs of its proposed regulation as "cavalier" and its consideration of potential
negative side effects as "cursory." Id. at 1223-24. Some have argued that the court required more
than the statute demanded. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles,99 MICH.
L. REV. 1651, 1682 (2ool). Nevertheless, such developments have created a greater incentive for
agencies to produce a thorough rulemaking record with a high-quality CBA. More recently, the
D.C. Circuit has exhibited a greater willingness to strike down rules based on their CBAs. See,
e.g., Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 E3 d 144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down a rule based on its
CBA, albeit for an independent agency not currently subject to presidential review).
324 See Sunstein, supra note 323, at 1654 ("[Tjhese principles (i) allow de minimis exceptions to
regulatory requirements; (2) authorize agencies to permit 'acceptable' risks, departing from a requirement of 'absolute' safety; (3) permit agencies to take account of both costs and feasibility;
and (4) allow agencies to balance costs against benefits.").
325 GAO, MONITORING AND TRANSPARENCY, supra note 134, at 12.
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first place. Self-insulation also undermines the potential for robust interagency deliberation about the technical effects of a rule. 3 2 6 Moreover, instruments to bypass review can impose consequences that conflict with the presidential agenda. Instruments to calibrate scrutiny
can undermine the public legitimacy of cost-benefit analysis. Timing
strategies and coalition-building attempts only exacerbate the potential
for adversarial antagonism. Accordingly, this section now briefly turns
to the other half of the game, so to speak, and considers some of the possible presidential responses and strategies to deal with the phenomenon.
Specifically, it focuses as a prescriptive matter on some of the institutional ways that Presidents might attempt to reduce agency selfinsulation, many of which already occur in practice as the need arises.
This perspective continues the broader historical dynamic between the
impulses of agency self-insulation and executive branch control. As
agencies have learned to adapt and manage each new development to
serve their own aims, Presidents have adopted incremental innovations
in response - for example, through efforts to increase the scope of review, 32 7 to bundle rules together to prevent rule-splitting,3 28 or to require information earlier in the review process. 329 Executive orders
and other forms of oversight are followed by agency adaptation, which
then spurs novel presidential responses, giving way yet again to new
executive orders and guidance documents, and so on.
At the same time, note that the President's interest in minimizing
self-insulation is itself constrained. Even with full information, the
President will not always seek to maximize control at all times and,
indeed, may sometimes find it beneficial not to do so.330 Because the
326 See Sunstein, supranote 27, at 1843 (noting the value of consultation with technical experts).
327 Compare Exec. Order No. 12,866 H§3 (f), 6, 3 C.F.R. 638, 641, 645 (1994) (establishing review
of regulatory actions likely to result in a rule), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 60, app. at 8691 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011), with Exec. Order No. 13,422 § 7, 3 C.F.R. 191, 193 (2008) (revoked
2009) (expanding review to "significant guidance documents").

328 A former OIRA branch chief, Arthur Fraas, reports that through parts of President Clinton's and President George W. Bush's Administrations, the EPA and OIRA had an informal
agreement that the EPA would submit for review rules that cost over $25 million per year. One of
the agreement's intended purposes was to prevent rule-splitting. See Email from Arthur Fraas,
former chief, Natural Res., Energy, and Agric. Branch, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to
author (May 1o, 2012, 10:58 AM EDT) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (cited with
author's permission).
329 Compare Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982) (revoked 1993) (no review of planned

regulatory actions), with Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986) (revoked 1993) (review of
planned significant regulatory actions).
330 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63
VAND. L. REV. 599, 6ol (2010) (noting that the "President does not always have a political interest
in seeking maximum control of regulatory policy"); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3169 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("As human beings have
known ever since Ulysses tied himself to the mast so as safely to hear the Sirens' song, sometimes
it is necessary to disable oneself in order to achieve a broader objective.").
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review process is costly and his resources constrained, the President
must be selective about which regulations to review and how much
time to spend reviewing them.3 3 His limited interest may arise from a
judgment that spending resources reviewing a particular rule would be
wasteful given clear signals that reversal would be highly unlikely. Or
it may be due to a desire to seek distance from rules that are politically
unpopular but are nevertheless required by statute. Finally, a credible
promise to engage in limited review can be a valuable carrot when
bargaining over some policy choice, either for current or future regulatory actions.
i.

Minimizing Self-Insulation Incentives. -

In situations where

agency slack is undesirable and arises from imperfect information,
however, the President could work to reduce the incentives to selfinsulate in the first place. Because agencies' incentives to self-insulate
increase (i) as their perceived preferences diverge from the President's
and (2) as the independent benefits of review decrease, it is useful to
think of both situations in turn.
First, the discussion so far has largely assumed that agencies have
some access to information about presidential reviewers and can thus
predict the likelihood of agreement. Indeed, they may rely on a number of proxies such as party affiliation, campaign promises, and information gleaned from their own informal contacts to predict likely review outcomes. That said, the current structure of presidential review
can also generate a fair amount of uncertainty until the review process
formally begins, particularly for those rules that are not high profile
enough to merit informal discussion.33 2 Because agencies can spend
months or years conducting research and outreach before drafting a
proposed rule, they can sometimes be caught flat-footed during review,
hearing then for the first time concerns raised by the White House and
other agencies.33 3
Even in cases where their preferences may not actually diverge,
uncertainty can increase the incentive for agencies to self-insulate from
presidential review. The higher the decision costs, the more costly a
possible reversal, so insulation will increasingly become the safer strat-

331 For one positive theory and analysis, see Acs & Cameron, supra note 24, at 22-28, which
models the President's targeting decision as an auditing game.
332 See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1850 ("For relatively less important rules, and those that do
not implicate the interests or concerns of other parts of the government, agencies might engage in
no interagency consultation in advance of the OIRA process.").
333 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 97, at 171-74 (discussing hypothetical but realistic EPA Phlogiston rule and observing that in the eighteen months before EPA submitted the draft to OMB,
"[t]here had been no contact between the EPA staff responsible for drafting the rule and the OMB
staff responsible for reviewing it," id. at 173).
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egy. 3 3 4 When insulation occurs under these circumstances, the outcome is inefficient in the sense that both parties might have chosen
other outcomes had full information been available. While mechanisms to increase the amount of earlier information already exist by
executive order, they are not used robustly in current practice. For example, President Clinton's executive order establishes a Regulatory
Working Group, consisting of "representatives of the heads of each
agency" that has "significant domestic regulatory responsibility, the
Advisors, and the Vice President."3 3 5 Its intended purpose was to
"serve as a forum to assist agencies in identifying and analyzing important regulatory issues," and it was directed to meet "at least quarterly."33 6 By the administration of President George W. Bush, however, the group was "no longer a functioning entity,"33 and it currently
meets only sporadically.
Similarly, the executive order provides for various early planning
mechanisms such as "agencies' policy meeting[s]" held by the Vice
President with the "Advisors and the heads of agencies to seek a common understanding of priorities," as well as the Unified Regulatory
Agenda and Plan.3 38 But the mechanisms' practical utility for the
purposes of increasing the amount of available information has been,
by all accounts, limited,3 3 9 with one former OIRA Administrator opining that the regulatory agenda "process itself has become more of a
paper exercise than an analytical tool. This is not new; before, during,
and after my tenure at OIRA the focus was on the transactions." 3 4 0

334 Conversely, when decision costs are low, agencies may be less likely to self-insulate given the
potential benefits of review.
335 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(d), 3 C.F.R. 638, 643 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 6oi app. at 86-91 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011).

336 Id.

337 Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Achieving Policymaking Consensus: The (Unfortunate) Waning of Negotiated Rulemaking, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 987, 997 (2008) ("[Ilt appears that in the Bush Administration
the Regulatory Working Group is no longer a functioning entity, despite its retention in the Order.").
A recent executive order on international regulatory cooperation, however, calls for a great deal of
coordination to be conducted through the Regulatory Working Group, which may revive the institution. See Exec. Order No. 13,6o9

§ 2,

77 Fed. Reg. 26,413, 26,413-14 (May 4, 2012), available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/od/executive-order-promoting-international
-regulatory-cooperation.
338 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(a)-(c), 3 C.F.R. at 642.
339 See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 239, at 1179 ("This planning process affords OIRA
several opportunities to identify regulations that might implicate the jurisdiction or interests of
other agencies, and to intervene to help ensure that such actions are consistent and coordinated.
It is not clear, however, whether in practice OIRA spends significant resources on such tasks."
(footnote omitted)).
340 Katzen, supra note 76, at II i; see also William F. West, PresidentialLeadership and Administrative Coordination:Examining the Theory of a Unified Executive, 36 PRESIDENTIAL STUD.
Q. 433, 445-46 (2006).
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Despite their authorization by executive order, what might explain
the decline in the use of such mechanisms that, on their face, could
provide a rich source of information to principals and agencies alike?
The analysis thus far suggests a few answers. The simplest (but perhaps the least interesting) are that agencies lack the resources to devote
to front-end planning and coordination, that OIRA lacks the resources
to enforce them, or both. On this account, as the resources of agencies
decrease, they will have a greater incentive to self-insulate since their
decision costs are now effectively higher. Similarly, as OIRA resources
decrease, agencies will be more successful in insulating since OIRA's
reviewing costs are now effectively higher. Indeed, the trend over the
last fifty years has been a steady increase in regulatory agency resources, alongside a decline in those of OIRA. 3 4 1 As a result, OIRA
has likely shifted resources toward transactional, back-end regulatory
review, and away from other early-stage coordination mechanisms.
Another possibility is that none of these planning mechanisms provides the fine-grained kind of information necessary to serve as an effective tool of presidential control given the potential diversity of issues in any single rule. As a result, the President has seen no reason to
enforce and use these planning mechanisms, exploring instead innovations designed to increase the amount of review time for specific rules
in response to strategic timing, as well as to enhance the benefits of review (and thus decrease the incentive for self-insulation). In support of
this hypothesis is the development of a practice known as "informal
review."3 4 2 Informal review simply means that agencies share preliminary drafts of rules or cost-benefit analyses informally with OIRA in
order to receive early input and feedback; sometimes this early review
can be initiated by a White House policy office.34 3 According to a
2001 annual OIRA congressional report: "This practice is useful for
agencies since they have the opportunity to educate OIRA desk officers in a more patient way, before the formal 90-day review clock at
OIRA begins to tick."3 44 It is "also useful for OIRA analysts" and other interagency reviewers "because they have an opportunity to flag se341 See SUSAN DUDLEY & MELINDA WARREN, WEIDENBAUM CTR. ON THE ECON., Gov'T
& PUB. POLICY & THE GEORGE WASH. UNIV. REGULATORY STUDIES CTR., GROWTH IN
REGULATORS' BUDGET SLOWED BY FISCAL STALEMATE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE U.S. BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEARS 2012 AND 2013, at 9-12 (2012); GAO, REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra
note 15, at 6o fig.8 (showing general trend in twenty-year decline in OIRA staffing resources from

ninety full-time staff in 1981 to fifty-five in 2003, though showing a small increase from forty-seven
staffers in 2ooo); Andrew Zajac, As Number of Regulators Rise, Their Overseer's Staff Shrinks,
WASH. POST, June 24, 2012, at Az4, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/business
/economy/regulators-surge-in-numbers-while-overseers-shrink/20I2/o6/24/gJQArWvDoV-story.html.
342 GAO, REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note i, at 36-38.
343 Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1849-50.
344 OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, supra note 102, at 43.
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rious problems early enough to facilitate correction before the agency's
position is irreversible." 3 4 5
In light of this Article's analysis, one would expect that the rules
that are most attractive to the agency for informal review are those
where the benefits of review are high (say, due to the need for interagency coordination and information sharing, political sensitivities, or
a particularly complicated cost-benefit analysis), the expectations of
reversal are lower, divergent preferences are uncertain but can be narrowed through earlier engagement, or some combination of the three.
One example of such a rule comes from the Clinton Administration,
under which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) asked to brief
OIRA informally on a proposed seafood safety regulation that was
likely to be economically significant. As the then-OIRA Administrator
recalls the events:
As the meeting went on (and on), the OIRA staff became increasingly
skeptical of the approach being pursued and began suggesting alternative
ways to achieve the FDA's objectives. The FDA staff left without any
commitments to follow up, but then they did. They worked with the
OIRA staff, and when the final seafood Hazard Analysis Critical Control
Point rule ultimately emerged, it was praised by all the stakeholders and
an official at FDA called to read me the headline from an editorial in a
newspaper from the Northwest calling it a "sensible regulation." 34 6
Along similar lines, a Congressional Research Service study reports
that informal review is "most common . . . when the rule is extremely
large and requires discussion with not only OMB but also other feder-

al agencies." 3 4 7
Of course, the executive branch cannot informally review each of
the hundreds of significant proposed and final rules submitted to
OIRA each year, but the value of informal review to all parties may be
another reason to suggest the need for Congress to consider increasing
OIRA resources. Alternatively, OIRA might consider more formally
acknowledging and encouraging informal review for those rules that
the agency already knows will be costly or politically sensitive, some34 8
thing that OIRA seems to have considered in the past.

345 Id.
346 Katzen, supra note 76, at 107 (footnote omitted). The regulation in question was codified at
21 C.F.R. pt. 123, § 1240.3, and § 1240.60.
347 COPELAND, supra note 15, at Is.

348 In early 2002, for example, then-OIRA Administrator John Graham said that OIRA was
trying "to create an incentive for agencies to come to us when they know they have something
that in the final analysis is going to be something we're going to be looking at carefully. And I
think that agencies that wait until the last minute and then come to us - well, in a sense, they're
rolling the dice." Rebecca Adams, Regulating the Rule-Makers: John Graham at OIRA, 60 CQ

WKLY. 520, 520 (2002) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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2. Decreasing Preference Divergence. - In addition to reducing
uncertainty through earlier engagement, the President can minimize
self-insulation by decreasing known preference divergence before the
formal review process begins. One way to do so is to expand the use
of "innovative techniques" that Presidents have used in the past to
"impress [their] own regulatory views on the administrative agencies."349 While these tools have often been characterized as mechanisms of control, another way to conceive of them is as tools to increase certainty about areas of potential preference alignment. These
techniques include the issuance of presidential directives, statements,
and memoranda to executive branch agency heads "instructing them to
take specified action within the scope of the discretionary power delegated to them by Congress." 3s0 These kinds of directives allow the
President to communicate his preferences up front and to instigate
agency actions rather than merely to review them.
In light of agencies' incentives to self-insulate by avoiding significance determinations, another mechanism the President could use in
response would be to perform randomized spot checks. As discussed,
agencies initially signal such determinations in their regulatory agendas or during listing exercises. 3 5 OIRA could select for closer review
a random sample from all rules not designated as "significant" or "economically significant" and request further information as warranted.
These spot checks would require that the agency provide some initial
estimates of the costs and benefits, to the extent feasible, as well as a
reasoned explanation of why the rule does not meet any of the significance criteria. 352
To illustrate, take the story of the former OIRA Administrator who
first learned from the pages of the Washington Post about a proposed
rule to require labeling of particular kinds of meat and poultry. It was
clear from the newspaper account that the regulation was likely to
have an economic impact of far greater than $ioo million. A dispute
ensued in which OIRA informed the Department of Agriculture that it
could either withdraw the rule or send a draft for review. The Department promptly chose to send a draft to OIRA.ass This example
illustrates what effectively amounted to a spot check, which may have

349 Kagan, supra note 37, at 2290.
350 Id.

351 See supra notes

8o-182 and accompanying text.

352 See RICHARD B. BELZER, PRESIDENTIAL REGULATORY REVIEW: SUGGESTIONS FOR

REFORM 49 (2oo9), available at http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/EO/fedRegReview/Regulatory
CheckbookComments_-_Belzer.pdf (suggesting a similar mechanism requiring that agencies be
directed to assemble an executive summary of the plausible benefits and costs of a regulatory action to help inform the initial draft rule's classification).
353 See Note, supra note 22, at Ioo0 (citing Carole Sugarman, Meat Labels to Carry Safety Instructions, WASH. POST, May 6, 1993, at Ai).
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helped to catch the rule before it was proposed, assuming that it had
been listed elsewhere.
The likely objection from agencies, however, would be that they
have neither sufficient information to provide to OIRA at the agenda
or listing stages nor the necessary resources to gather it. As such, a
more effective but also more costly strategy would be for OIRA to invite external spot checks on the regulatory agenda as a whole and to
have a regular process for reviewing them. OIRA could specifically
request that commenters contest any of the priority designations and
that they provide any available data pertaining to the potential rule's
impacts. Of course, this effort would depend on the expansion of
OIRA's already limited resources.
3. Reducing Internal Review Costs. - In the absence of additional
resources, another set of presidential strategies would entail effectively
reducing reviewing costs by providing agencies with guidance designed
to facilitate review, particularly for non-OIRA presidential reviewers
such as other agencies or White House offices. The issuance in 2003 Of
CircularA-4, which "provides ... guidance to Federal agencies on the
development of regulatory analysis," 354 may be understood in this
light. So too may OIRA's recent issuance of a checklist, primer, and
frequently asked questions for regulatory impact analysis, effectively a
suite of tools to lower reviewing costs. 3 5 Indeed, Sunstein writes that
"[a]ll of these documents are designed to promote simplicity and clarity
for agencies and the public alike."35 6 The same intuition would apply
to presidential reviewers as well.
A similar rationale would also hold for OIRA's recent guidance
document stating that "regulatory preambles for lengthy or complex
rules (both proposed and final) should include straightforward executive summaries" that "separately describe major provisions and policy
choices."35
These changes, if implemented, would help reduce the
amount of time spent during review attempting to clarify various provisions with the agency, thus allowing more resources to be devoted to
resolving any underlying policy disagreements.
354 OMB, CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 77, at I.
355 OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, AGENCY CHECKLIST. REGULATORY IM-

PACT ANALYSIS

(20io), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg

/regpol/RIAChecklist.pdf; see also OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATO-

RY IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER (201i), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default
/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/circular-a-4_regulatory-impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf; OIRA, FAQs, supra
note 198.
356 Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Empirically Informed Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1388-

89

(2011).

357 Memorandum from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm'r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, Clarifying Regulatory Requirements: Executive Summaries i (Jan. 4, 2012), available at http://www
.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/clarifying-regulatory-requirements
_executive-summaries.pdf.
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4. Timing Regulation Strategies. - Finally, from the perspective of
the President, strategic timing by agencies changes the cost structure
for reviewers, disrupting other forces and procedures that exist to help
prioritize the attention given to a regulation. In other words, "strategic
timing is a form of subterfuge that reduces the otherwise existing forces that calibrate the extent of monitoring to the importance of the decision."3ss One strategy to mitigate this possibility would be to adopt
formally what Professors Jacob Gersen and Anne O'Connell have
called a "coordination rule," the purpose of which would be to give
agencies and reviewers alike notice about the need to shift priorities ex
ante to the most salient forthcoming regulatory actions in order to allow sufficient time for review. 359 This type of coordination device
could prescribe, for example, a specific time period for review, set and
agreed upon by both parties in advance - for example, as soon as the
legal or statutory deadline was promulgated.
This strategy could be implemented simply as a matter of practice
and mutual agreement between particular agencies and OIRA. A
more formal adoption may require revision to the existing executive
orders, which require agencies to notify OIRA of any statutory or judicial deadlines and, "to the extent practicable, [to] schedule rulemaking
proceedings so as to permit sufficient time for OIRA to conduct its review as set forth" in the order - that is, the ninety-day default rule.3 6 0
One blunt way to attempt to enforce this ninety-day coordination rule
better would be simply to delete the language, "to the extent practicable." However, to address the likely and legitimate agency response
that many deadlines do not allow sufficient time to prepare and submit a rule ninety days before the deadline, a more realistic strategy
may be a tailored one: to adopt mutually for particular rules an earlyreview period during which OIRA could begin to review parts of the
rule (for example, the regulatory impact analysis) as they become
available, a practice that already occurs under informal review. Some
have also suggested a more formal early-review process for rules with
expected annual benefits or costs of over $i billion. 361 More generally,
an agency and OIRA could also agree on other review-period lengths
that are fixed ex ante, calibrated either to the perceived importance of

358 Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in the Administrative State, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1157, 1206 (2009).
359 Id. at 1204.
360 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(D), 3 C.F.R 638, 646 (1994) (emphasis added), reprinted as
amended in 5 U.S.C. § 6o app. at 86-91 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2o1).
361 see SUSAN DUDLEY & ARTHUR FRAAS, THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY OVERSIGHT
AND ANALYSIS 3 (Mercatus Ctr., Mercatus on Policy No. 51, 2oo9), available at http://mercatus
.org/sites/default/files/publication/MOP5 iOIRAweb.pdf.
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the rule or to the length of time that Congress has granted the agency
to promulgate the rule.
B. Courts
In light of the incentives for agency self-insulation and the available presidential responses for minimizing them, what are some implications of these dynamics, if any, for the courts? As an initial matter,
how one answers this question will likely track what one thinks about
the general merits of presidential control, a question underlying many
of the constitutional and statutory debates about its proper scope. 3 6 2
On the one hand, if one believes that the presidential control model
has been a valuable, even necessary, development for legitimizing the
administrative state, then agency self-insulation is cause for concern,
and courts should act to minimize it. Here, supporters often cite the
President's electoral accountability and national constituency as reasons to check agency overzealousness and capture.3 63 Only the President, they argue, has the bird's-eye view necessary to coordinate and
harmonize agency efforts; he is also the best situated to respond dynamically to changed circumstances. 36 4
On the other hand, if one believes that presidential review is illegitimate, then self-insulation is cause for celebration and courts should
seek to encourage it. In this view, that executive branch agencies can
fend for themselves helps to alleviate an otherwise worrisome state of
affairs. The risk of capture, these critics argue, is equally likely for
Executive Office of the President (EOP) entities and presidential review is unduly shrouded in secrecy.3 65 Agencies are more expert relative to the White House at fulfilling their statutory missions,3 66 particularly for issues with longer time horizons. 367
There is, however, a likely and necessary middle ground between
these two camps at their most extreme - that is, between those who
believe that presidential involvement is always legitimate, even necessary, and those who believe it is never so except in the narrowest of
circumstances. As a practical matter, Presidents have sought to influence their agency heads through ad hoc and informal means for centuries, with interventions only becoming increasingly institutionalized
362 See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 37, at 2376-77; Stack, supra note 35; Strauss, supra
note

124.

363 See Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Commentary, White House Review of
Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075, 1080-8i (1986); Kagan, supra note 37, at 2331-38.

364 See Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Beyond Marbury: The Executive's Power to Say What the Law
Is, 115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2583 (2006); see also Pierce, supra note 231, at 113.
365 See RENA STEINZOR ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, BEHIND CLOSED
DOORS AT THE WHITE HOUSE 34 (201H); Bagley & Revesz, supra note 108, at 13o8-io.

366 See Lisa Heinzerling, Statutory Interpretationin the Era of OIRA, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1097, 1I16 (2oo6).

367 See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 33o, at 613-14.
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through formal review in the last three decades.3 6 8 Against this backdrop, one relevant question is how and when such involvement can be
made legitimately transparent such that other institutions like courts
and Congress can serve as effective checks when necessary.3 69 To the
extent that transparency provides some common ground, such a position recognizes that presidential review is often constructive and valuable - allowing for greater information sharing, the benefit of interagency expertise, 37 0 and oversight to prevent unnecessarily conflicting
policies. 3 1' At other times, however, it may be unambiguously inappropriate, for example if a President directs an agency head to conceal
or fabricate scientific data in support of some outcome.
Between these poles are a host of possible interventions, whose legitimacy will depend on their specific nature and the features of the
underlying authorizing statutes. Normative determinations about presidential review (and by extension, agency self-insulation from it) must
thus necessarily be made case by case, evaluated against specific statutory and factual circumstances. In some situations, under particular
administrations, such interventions will be substantively constructive
and beneficial, while in others, they will be less so. Accordingly, the
soundest prescriptions should ask, as an initial step, how to reveal
presidential involvement in order to facilitate individual judgments
that are assessed against Congress's demands.
i.
Self-Insulation as Undue PoliticizationSignal. - Despite provisions under current executive orders for agencies and OIRA to dis37 2
close the changes made as a result of the presidential review process,
368 See Mashaw, supra note 65, at 1304-06 (illustrating, with historical reference to President
George Washington and his successors, how "[s]upervisory control of executive action at the very
top - that is, any matter involving the head of a department - was both informal and power-

ful," id. at

1304).

Of course, such disclosure should be balanced against the competing importance of executive deliberative privilege. See 5 U.S.C. § 5s2(b)(5) (2006) (incorporating executive privilege
through exemption from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act). For examples of
some disclosure-related proposals, see Kathryn A. Watts, Proposinga Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, i19 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2oog), and Mendelson, supra note 13o, at 1159.
Professor Kathryn Watts argues that agencies should be allowed to justify their actions with political reasons "so long as the political influences are openly and transparently disclosed in the agency's rulemaking record." Watts, supra, at 8. Beyond its role in facilitating transparency and accountability, greater disclosure could also often raise reversal costs for the President since he (or
other executive branch officials) would now likely have to provide a public explanation.
370 See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1856 ("The resulting discussions typically produce stronger
rules."); id. at 1858 ("[OIRA's] goal is to find a reasonable and mutually agreeable resolution.").
37
See Bagley & Revesz, supra note io8.
372 Under current executive orders, after a regulatory action has been published in the Federal
Register or otherwise issued to the public, agencies are directed to "[miake available to the public"
information such as the text of the draft regulatory action and the CBA; to "[i]dentify for the public, in a complete, clear, and simple manner, the substantive changes between the draft submitted
to OIRA for review and the action subsequently announced"; and to "[ildentify for the public
those changes in the regulatory action that were made at the suggestion or recommendation of
369
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such disclosures are not regularly made in practice, leading some to
suggest more forceful statutory disclosure requirements.3 7 3 Until such
changes occur, courts will have to rely on various second-best signals
or heuristics, like indicia of agency self-insulation, to evaluate the nature of presidential involvement. Thus, for example, when courts observe signs of self-insulation, such as abrupt shifts in policymaking
form, poor-quality cost-benefit analysis (CBA), or truncated presidential review time, then such efforts, taken together, could reflect signs of
resistance or "danger signals"37 4 that invite greater judicial scrutiny
under hard look or Chevron's Step Two reasonableness review. 37 5
Such signals would, of course, need to be understood within their
broader context, an inquiry that would benefit from future empirical
work as to whether agencies systematically self-insulate and the conditions under which they are most likely to do so.
Whether agency self-insulation is a salutary or subversive phenomenon, in turn, will ultimately depend on the particular reason for the
agency's expected preference divergence from the President, and
whether that reason is sanctioned by statute. For example, in cases
that reflect an agency's efforts to protect from interference technical
judgments grounded in a statute narrowly constraining policy discreOIRA." Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(E), 3 C.F.R. 638, 646 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5
U.S.C. §6oi app. at 86-91 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). The orders also, among other things, direct
OIRA to forward all written communications between OIRA and external sources to the agency,
to publicly disclose them, and eventually to "make available to the public all documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency during the review." Id. § 6(b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. at 648.
373 See Mendelson, supra note 13o, at 148-54, 1164.
374 Greater Bos. 'Tlevision Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 8sz (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.) (arguing the court should "intervene" under arbitrary and capricious review when it "becomes aware,
especially from a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a 'hard look'
at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making" (footnote
omitted) (quoting WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, I156 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (internal quotation mark omitted))).
375 Chevron, of course, provides that judges must defer to an agency's reasonable construction
of a statutory ambiguity when the statute itself evinces a legislative intent to delegate that interpretive authority. Its two-part test is a familiar one: First, the judge must ask "whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). If Congress's intent is "clear," then that intention governs;
but if the statute is ambiguous or silent, then in Step Two, courts ask whether the agency's interpretation is "permissible" and, if so, defer accordingly. Id. at 842-43. Some lower courts have
also incorporated elements of arbitrary and capricious review and inquire as to whether an agency
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Leavitt, 368 F.3 d 1300, 1304 (1 Ith
Cir. 2oo4); Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 83 F.3d 1497, 15o6-07
(D.C. Cir. 1996); see also Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step 71oo Reconsidered, 72
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997); Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83
(1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, go COLUM. L. REV. 2071,
2105 (1990) (noting that Chevron's "reasonableness inquiry should probably be seen as similar to
the inquiry into whether the agency's decision is 'arbitrary' or 'capricious' within the meaning of
the APA").
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tion, indicia of self-insulation could serve as signals of undue politicization meriting greater scrutiny.37 6 Indeed, familiar administrative law
principles provide that agencies can act only under legislative delegations of authority, must remain within the confines of that authority,
and may take into account only those factors set out by Congress.
Under hard look review, for example, the State Farm Court provided
that agencies must consider "relevant factors" but not those "factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider."37 As for Chevron's
second step, one way to understand the analogous question is whether
statutory ambiguity on a decisional factor permits an interpretation allowing consideration of that factor.3 78
Under either doctrinal inquiry, courts should inquire whether the
statute evinces a legislative intent to restrict certain forms of policy
discretion of the kind more likely to be elevated to higher-level policy
officials during presidential review, including questions of flexibility,
timing, and cost-benefit tradeoffs. 3 7 9 One way to understand this task
would be to consider to which actors within an agency or the executive
branch - whether career staff, experts, White House policy officials,
and so on - Congress would have wanted to allocate the decisionmaking power under particular statutory schemes, and to evaluate the
likelihood that those actors were afforded that power given signals of
agency self-insulation. 380 When the relevant statute can be interpreted
to narrowly limit as the basis of decisionmaking discretionary factors
more likely to be associated with raw presidential preferences, then
self-insulation is more likely to be a meritorious agency attempt to pro-

376 "Politicization," as the term is used here, refers to the influence of nonexpert actors whose
authority stems largely, if not solely, from their connection to an elected official. Despite its sometimes pejorative connotation, politicization as understood here need not be pernicious, but can
rather be legitimizing; thus, the adjective "undue" is important in this context. See BYRON W.
DAYNES & GLEN SUSSMAN, WHITE HOUSE POLITICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 199, 236

(2010) (describing how vice presidents can "make a difference," id. at 236, in regulatory policy and
providing the example of Vice President Cheney under the George W. Bush Administration);
Sunstein, supra note 27, at I873 (noting that "political issues might be taken into account by other
offices," including the White House Office of Legislative Affairs and the Chief of Staff's Office).
377 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
378 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., What Factors Can an Agency Consider
in Making a Decision?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 68-69 (discussing parallel analysis under
State Farm and Chevron).
379 See Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1872 (describing "significant questions of policy, including
the kind that might be 'elevated"' to involve, for example, discussions of flexibility, delayed compliance dates, and "public health or safety" goals); see also id. at 1873 (describing how particular
White House offices may be charged with the consideration of "political issues" and the "President's overall priorities, goals, agenda, and schedule").
380 Cf Magill & Vermeule, supra note 2 (examining how legal doctrines allocate power to various actors within agencies).
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tect its relative expertise. 3 8 ' In this manner, courts can serve a narrow,
boundary-enforcing role against the possibility of executive overreach,
and indicia of self-insulation would be but signals to alert the need for
this inquiry.38 2
Conversely, when the underlying statute allows for broad discretionary factors of the kind likely to be considered during presidential
review, self-insulation is more likely to be inappropriate, for it now
constitutes an unjustifiable effort to avoid the interest balancing that
underlies presidential accountability. In this manner, courts should
first determine the extent to which the statute at issue attempts to prohibit or allows for discretionary policy judgments, and then treat agency self-insulation accordingly. While this analysis is unlikely to admit
of bright lines given the diversity of statutory schemes and the potential for overlap between the categories of expert and political judgments, the analytic distinctions may nevertheless be useful as courts
apply them case by case. These judgments may well draw upon familiar tools of statutory construction, the identity of the statutory delegate, or the structure of the agency at issue,3 83 but as a general matter,
this functional approach would seek to facilitate separation of powers
principles within the executive branch. 384
To illustrate, consider some statutory provisions that courts have
interpreted to prohibit the consideration of certain policy factors, such
as economic costs, which are particularly likely to be salient to the
President. For example, the Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Hill8 examined a statute requiring federal agencies "'to insure that
381 This is not to say that self-insulation under such statutes is always warranted, or that such
statutes should be understood to preclude presidential review: the review process can also yield
valuable and relevant expertise and opportunities for deliberation. Rather, the concern here arises
when the determinative influence is not of the expert character called for by a particular statutory
scheme, and is therefore undue under that statute. In this manner, the interpretive analysis
should focus on the kinds of factors the agencies should consider under the statute, and the likely
and legitimate sources of influence regarding those factors.
382 See Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-EnforcingDecisions, and the Unitary Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL'Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1 (2010).

383 The analysis suggested here would be most applicable to cases involving executive agencies
subject to presidential review, since self-insulation signals would reflect attempts to avoid such
review. Some current Justices appear willing to recognize the distinction between executive and
independent agencies as a basis for variations in judicial review. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 18oo, 1829 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that the FCC commissioners
"have fixed terms of office; they are not directly responsible to the voters; and they enjoy an independence expressly designed to insulate them, to a degree, from 'the exercise of political oversight"' (quoting Freytag v. Comm'r, 50 U.S. 868, 916 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment))).
384 Thanks to Dean Robert Post for this suggestion. See also Neal Kumar Katyal, Essay, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branchfrom Within, i 15 YALE
L.J. 2314 (2oo6).
385 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
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actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize
the continued existence' of an endangered species." 3 86 It held that the
provision prohibits flexibility, or what it called "fine utilitarian calculations,"38 and thereby halted the completion of a dam in which millions of dollars had already been invested.3 8 Similarly, in Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass'ns,3 89 the Court held that a provision requiring
air pollution standards to be set at a level "requisite to protect the public health" with an "adequate margin of safety" 390 did not allow costs
to be taken into account when setting the standards; the Court therefore rejected a contrary EPA interpretation under Chevron's second
step.3 91 Courts would likely also prohibit the consideration of costs
under statutes that call for, say, mandating "practicable" standards
"permitting no discharge of pollutants, 392 or decisions based on the
"best science" or otherwise specifying more resolutely technical and
expertise-based decisional criteria.3 93
By contrast, in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,394 the Court held
that a Clean Water Act 3 95 provision calling on the EPA to require the
use of the "best technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact" 396 allows the EPA to balance costs and benefits when
determining how to interpret the statute.3 97 Here, the majority read
Congress's silence about the propriety of considering "cost," relative to
other statutory provisions in the Act, to mean that the EPA could consider it as a decisional factor, and therefore upheld the Agency action
under Chevron's reasonableness inquiry.398 Read broadly, this approach resonates with a number of D.C. Circuit cases applying hard
look review and holding that when Congress is silent with respect to a
logically relevant factor, then that silence should be read to permit the
agency to consider the factor.3 99 More narrowly, this presumption op396 Id.

at 173 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)).
387 Id. at 187.
388

Id. at 174.

389 531 U.S. 457 (2001).

390 Id. at 465 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 74og(b)(I) (2oo6)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
391 Id. at 481.
392 33 U.S.C. §

1316(a)(I) (2oo6); see also Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498,
that the Court would likely reach this conclusion).
(suggesting
1506 (2009)
393

See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. H# 1531-1544 (2006); see also Watts, supra

note 369, at 45-47.
129 S. Ct. 1498.
395 33 U.S.C. §§ 125 1-1387 (2oo6 & Supp. V 201I).
396 Id. § 1326(b) (2006).
397 Entergy Corp., 129 S. Ct. at 15 10.
398 Id. at 1508.
394

399 Pierce, supra note 378, at 73-75 (citing, for example, Allied Local & Regional Manufacturers
Caucus v. EPA, 215 F 3d 61, 77-78 (D.C. Cir. 2000), and Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3 d 663, 678
(D.C. Cir. 2000), in a discussion of the D.C. Circuit's jurisprudence on interpreting congressional
silence).
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erated in the specific context of the text and structure of the Clean Water Act and was thus an ordinary exercise in statutory interpretation,
as opposed to a broader cost-benefit default rule. Before assessing
self-insulation signals, courts should continue to examine the extent,
if any, to which specific statutes allow agencies to consider particular
policy factors.
As for how courts would evaluate agency self-insulation after undertaking such an inquiry, Massachusetts v. EPA4 00 may help to illustrate. There, a bare majority held that the EPA had failed to provide
an adequate rationale for its denial of a rulemaking petition filed by a
number of states and private plaintiffs to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. 4 0 1 Under Chevron, the interpretive
question was whether Congress intended carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases to be "air pollutant[s]" under the statute. 4 0 2 Finding
the text "unambiguous" at Chevron Step One, the majority held that
the EPA indeed possesses the statutory authority to regulate them. 403
More relevantly for our purposes, the Agency's alternative argument
was that even if it did possess the requisite authority, it could still lawfully exercise its discretion by declining to regulate for policy-related
reasons commonly considered during presidential review, such as the
executive branch's desire to coordinate its programs, to avoid a "piecemeal approach" to climate change, and to give the President the necessary flexibility with which to negotiate with "key developing nations." 404
Rejecting these arguments, the Court under hard look review held
that such reasoning was "divorced from the statutory text." 4 05 Specifically, it found that while the statute ties such discretion to the EPA's
"judgment,"40 6 that judgment has to be grounded in whether an air
pollutant "cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 4 07 In other
words, the Clean Air Act 408 cabined the amount of policy discretion
available such that the EPA could decline to take further action only
upon a technical, expert determination that greenhouse gases did not
contribute to climate change, or by providing another reasoned expla-

400 549 U.S- 497 (2007).
401 See id. at 534-35.
402 Id. at 528 (internal quotation marks omitted).
403 Id. at 529.
404 Id. at 533-34.

405 Id. at 532; see also id. at 534 (holding that EPA action was "arbitrary, capricious, ... or otherwise not in accordance with law" (alteration in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A)
(2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
406 Id. at 532 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 752 i(a)(i)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
407 Id. at 532-33 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 752 i(a)(i)).

408 42 U.S.C.

§H

7401-767iq (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011).
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nation for why it could not or would not exercise its judgment. 409 After finding that the EPA had "offered no reasoned explanation for its
refusal to decide," the Court found the EPA's action to be arbitrary
and capricious and remanded accordingly.4 10
Shortly after the decision, some argued that the case represented an
effort by the Court to privilege expertise over politics, and referred to
the "political, cultural, and legal context" as a cue that something was
amiss within the EPA.411 Using the lens of agency self-insulation, one
could also understand the EPA's petition denial as yet another sign of
its attempt to avoid what it knew would be a costly reversal by the
Bush Administration, which had made its views on climate change
clear. By choosing inaction instead of proceeding with a rule, the EPA
was engaging in a form of self-insulation. Indeed, according to various
accounts, the Bush "administration had been altering scientific reports,
silencing its own experts, and suppressing scientific information" suggesting "a significant rise in global temperatures and linking the rise to
human activity."4 12 Thus, the Agency had every reason to believe that
its efforts to initiate a rulemaking would be rebuffed by the President.
Indeed, these fears of reversal were well-founded, as further borne
out by events following the Court's decision. After the EPA prepared
what was apparently a proposed rule concluding that greenhouse gases
endangered public welfare, reports circulated that "OMB officials
[had] told the EPA that its email containing the document would not
be opened," later leading the EPA to issue only a weak advance notice
of proposed rulemaking that offered no endangerment conclusion. 413
This choice of policymaking form was arguably another act of selfinsulation, an abrupt shift from a would-be proposed rule to a more
tentative advance notice that offered little information. The document
revealed, in an unusually visible manner, the disagreement between
the EPA's political leadership and its career staff about the ability to
regulate greenhouse gases under existing statutory authorities. 4 14
While the advance notice itself discussed all the ways in which the
EPA could successfully do so, it was prefaced by an uncommon state409 While this Article locates the doctrinal inquiry at Chevron Step Two, the Court's inquiry
here under Step One took a similar form in that it asked whether Congress's silence (and thus
ambiguity) about policy-related factors allowed for the Court to interpret the statute to permit their
consideration. See Massachusetts,549 U.S. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See generally Matthew
C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009) (arguing for collapsing the distinction between Chevron Step One and Step Two).
410 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534-35.
411 Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics
to Expertise, 2007
Sup. CT. REV. 5 I, 61.
412 Id. at 55.
413 Mendelson, supra note 13o,
at 1153.
414 See Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354

(proposed July 30, 2oo8) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. i).
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ment signed by the Administrator stating that such efforts would "inevitably result in a very complicated, time-consuming and, likely, convoluted set of regulations" that would "largely pre-empt or overlay existing programs that help control greenhouse gas emissions and would
be relatively ineffective at reducing greenhouse gas concentrations
given the potentially damaging effect on jobs and the U.S.
economy."415
Amid the Bush Administration's "censorious posture," the EPA
simply sat "on a trove of materials - a proposed endangerment finding, a proposal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, a proposed reporting rule for greenhouse gases, [and] a proposal
on renewable fuel standards." 416 After spending considerable resources
preparing them, the EPA had decided that near-certain presidential
reversal would be more costly, and thus chose instead to insulate its
rules. In this manner, such behavior can signal attempts to resist political influences that are invisible during other administrative procedures that begin after a rule has been presidentially reviewed, such as
notice and comment.
Of course, not all instances when an agency chooses a guidance
document rather than a rule, for example, or submits a rule close to a
statutory deadline or with a weak CBA, represent attempts to selfinsulate. Sometimes these patterns of behavior are not in fact choices
at all, but reflect instead top-down directions from the White House
after a rule has been submitted; however, these situations too are informative when viewed in the context of statutes that demand regulatory action or a reasoned explanation for failing to undertake it. Alternatively, the preference divergence could be the result of industry
capture of the agency head; this possibility would need to be evaluated
with reference to the industry in question and the regulating agency. 4 17
Finally, self-insulation could also be motivated by resource constraints
and divorced from substantive policy judgments. Evaluating why selfinsulation occurs in a particular case will thus necessarily involve a
context-specific and case-by-case inquiry, but indicia of self-insulation
should, at a minimum, prompt courts to undertake such an inquiry.
At the same time, recall that presi2. Monitoring Facilitation.dential review serves as both a kind of political review of issues that
the President has judged salient to his agenda as well as a form of analytical review of the ways in which agencies evaluate costs and benefits, choose among potential alternatives, and consider technical issues,

415 Id. at 44,355.
416 Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change at EPA, 64 FLA. L. REV. I, 6 (2012).
417 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 35, at 71 (describing the Consumer Product Safety Commis-

sion as one of the most captured agencies).
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as appropriate. 4 18 While these categories can be interrelated and difficult to disentangle, they are nevertheless analytically distinct and can
help serve as orienting poles. When agencies attempt to insulate themselves from analytical review, then another important role for the
courts, likely to appeal to both sides of the presidentialist debate,
would be for courts to understand themselves as monitoringfacilitators.4 19 In this role, the courts would help to ensure that external political monitors, such as interest groups or Congress, have the requisite
high-quality information about potential regulatory consequences in
order to facilitate fire-alarm oversight and the resolution of competing
interests through overtly political processes. One way to do so would
be to encourage the availability of information sources external to the
presidential review process, that is, cost-benefit figures or substantive
data about regulatory impacts that are neither agency-provided nor
presidentially reviewed.
As long as one agrees that agents, such as administrative agencies,
should implement the goals of their principals - the President, Congress, or society more broadly - the dynamics of self-insulation sure
to be the most troubling are those that mask the effects of agency action.4 20 Indeed, this Article has proposed a conception of agencies as
actors that choose regulatory instruments with distinct bundles of
characteristics, some of which make presidential review more difficult
by limiting the amount and quality of information about potential im418 See Shapiro, supranote 84; Sunstein, supra note 27, at 1868-74.

419 This Article's concept of monitoring facilitation bears a close family resemblance to Professor Eric Posner's "signal refinement theory," which understands the cost-benefit signal's value as
sorting efficient projects from inefficient ones. See Posner, supra note 20, at 1191 ("Courts should
try to raise the difference between the cost of issuing a plausible cost-benefit analysis of an efficient project and the cost of issuing a plausible cost-benefit analysis of an inefficient project.").
The same is true of Professor Matthew Stephenson's notion of "costly signaling" under "hard look
review," which posits that the "quality of the agency's defense of its regulatory decision provides a
signal of the benefits the agency expects to receive if the court upholds the regulation." Stephenson,
supra note 2 16, at 766. The monitoring facilitation role differs from these conceptions insofar as it
sees the purpose of increasing information quality not as a means for evaluating the efficiency or
agency net benefits of a project, but rather as a way to increase information about a regulation's
perceived consequences (whether in quantitative or qualitative terms) in order to allow for more
robust political contestation about them. Stated differently, this view does not see courts as attempting to facilitate the use of cost-benefit analysis as a decision rule, but rather as a means of
helping to ensure that external political monitors, such as interest groups or Congress, have the
requisite high-quality information about potential regulatory consequences to facilitate the resolution of competing interests through overtly political processes.
420 The various ways that courts have policed agencies' strategic use of adjudication or guidance documents instead of rulemaking in efforts to "achieve [their] goalqs] only (or mainly) because
of the form [they] chose," Magill, supra note 3, at 1446, have been adequately and ably discussed
elsewhere, see id. at 1437-42. To summarize Professor Elizabeth Magill's analysis, courts can calibrate their standards of review or otherwise adjudge guidance documents and other agency action as ripe for review, all in an attempt to police agencies' choices of form when they offend the
courts' notions of procedural fairness or sound policy development. Id. at 1438.
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pacts (such as the avoidance of rulemaking or the manipulation of significance determinations and cost-benefit analyses), and some of which
simply raise the resource and political costs of presidential reversal (for
example, timing strategies or coalition building with career staff or
other executive branch entities).
At root, these instruments succeed by blunting the signals that
principals ordinarily rely upon to assess an action's potential salience
to their agendas and priorities. For example, when agencies flag regulatory actions as nonsignificant, significant, or economically significant,
these significance determinations should indicate the action's potential
priority for the President. Agency assessments of costs and benefits
serve a similar function by identifying potential regulatory consequences that may be salient to various groups or constituencies. This
is true whether the costs and benefits are fully quantified or described
qualitatively. Attempts at strategic self-insulation are, for the most
part, efforts to reduce information quality.421
Accordingly, doctrinal developments post-Chevron granting more
deference when agencies engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking
should be understood as constructive efforts to encourage the development of external sources of information for the rulemaking record.
In United States v. Mead Corp., for example, the Court considered
whether to grant Chevron deference to a tariff classification ruling by
the U.S. Customs Service. It held that the ruling was not eligible for
such deference because Chevron applies when Congress has delegated
authority "to make rules carrying the force of law" and the agency has
acted pursuant to that authority when interpreting the statute. 42 2 The
Court noted that when Congress provides for a "relatively formal administrative procedure" that fosters "fairness and deliberation," such as
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, it is reasonable to presume such legislative intent.4 13 In the absence of such
information-forcing processes, Barnhart v. Walton 424 later provided that
deference is only potentially due upon a consideration of a number of
factors, including the nature of the legal question and the agency's relevant expertise and experience. 42 5 By giving agencies an incentive to
421 Of course, this premise should not be overstated; there are many other reasons, besides conveying information about consequences, that explain agency behavior, such as the choice of form.
Agencies often choose to pursue adjudication over rulemaking, for example, when they are uncertain about which policy to pursue, see id. at 1396-97; alternatively, Congress may have dictated
the form of regulatory instrument for agencies to use or otherwise minimized the discretion available for agency action.
422 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001).
423 Id. at 230.

424 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
425 See id. at 221-22. In Barnhart, the Court considered the Social Security Administration's
interpretation of the Social Security Act, first through a series of informal means, and then

2013}1

AGENCY SELF-INSULATION

1833

garner information from the public or through adversarial procedures,
courts have helped to ameliorate the effects of strategic information
provision under presidential review by soliciting data from independent sources.
Similarly, when the quality of an agency's CBA is poor as a result
of an attempt to reduce the scrutiny of presidential review, a harder
look under arbitrary and capricious review may be judicially appropriate since there was less initial information for public comment or
oversight. Moreover, courts could not only examine the agency's proffered responses to public input, but also consider as one factor the
source of the comments, taking favorable notice when those sources
are pluralistic or from more neutral, expert bodies such as the National
Academy of Sciences. Giving weight to such factors is more likely to
increase the accuracy of the information through robust contestation.
Of course, courts cannot require agencies to undertake any additional procedures other than those required by statute. 4 2 6 Rather, here
they would simply give agencies an incentive to invite external evaluations of their own work. For example, some courts have taken notice
when there are independent evaluations of costs and benefits in the
record before upholding environmental impact statements as reasonable under the National Environmental Policy Act. 4 2 7 In a related
vein, courts have also critically viewed agency rejections of expert advisory committee opinions, especially when those opinions are required

through notice-and-comment rulemaking. In holding that Chevron applied, the Court explained
that deference was due depending on "the interpretive method used and the nature of the question
at issue." Id. at 222. As applied to the case at hand, the inquiry could include a number of factors:
In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the
Agency, the importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity
of that administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question
over a long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens
through which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.
Id. Barnhart and Mead clarified that Chevron deference applies to interpretations with the force
of law or promulgated pursuant to formal procedures such as formal adjudication or notice-andcomment rulemaking, but that other expertise-based factors could warrant deference as well approaches that have been followed, in varying degrees, by the lower courts. See, e.g., Mylan
Labs., Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3 d 1272, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman,
How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1457-74
(2005) (discussing in detail how lower courts have applied Mead and Barnhart).
426 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524
(1978) (holding that section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act "established the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in
conducting rulemaking procedures").
427 See, e.g., Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F-3d 1125, 1143 ( th
9
Cir. 2oo6) (taking note of "an independent technical review of the benefits and costs analysis in the
draft [environmental impact assessment, which] stated that the assumptions and overall conclusions of the benefits analysis were 'reasonable' and that 'data were generally used properly in the
overall analysis'").
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by statute, 42 8 and conversely have regarded careful consideration of
concerns raised by such committees favorably.42 9 Similar approaches
could further aid the hard look inquiry.
C. Congress
To facilitate these doctrinal refinements, Congress could and should
also play an important role in fostering independent evaluations of
CBAs and improving such analyses' quality as signals of regulatory
impact. The Truth in Regulating Act of 2000,430 for example, temporarily required the GAO to provide its own external evaluations of
agencies' CBAs for final rules. 4 3 1 However, the implementation of the
provision depended on an additional $5.2 million in the GAO's annual
appropriations. The funds were never granted. 432 Alternatively, as
Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman suggests, an independent body (which
she would call the Office for the Review of Policy Analytic Techniques)
could also be placed within the GAO, the National Science Foundation, or the National Academy of Sciences. 433 By creating and funding
such a body, Congress could play an important role in helping to
improve the quality of agency informational signals, thereby helping
to counter the structural incentives for strategic behavior and agency
self-insulation.
Ultimately, supplying this kind of information would improve the
ability of external actors to monitor agency behavior and would also
reduce the risk that such information might be simply dismissed as
"cheap talk" and discounted. 434 Indeed, when agents act strategically
amidst information asymmetries, the private incentives for information
aggregation and revelation are likely to depart from what is desirable
to facilitate adequate monitoring by principals (again, whether the
President, Congress, or society more broadly). 435 Independent evalua428 See, e.g., Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. EPA, 559 E d 512, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("The EPA
3
failed adequately to explain its reason for not accepting the [Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee]'s recommendations .... ").
429 Coal. of Battery Recyclers Ass'n v. EPA, 604 F 3 d 613, 61g (D.C. Cir. 2010) (favorably noting that the EPA had considered some of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee's concerns,
despite not following its precise recommendations).
430 5 U.S.C. § 80i note at 107-o8 (2006).
431 Id. While it is true that the GAO also responds to congressional research requests, its head
is appointed for a lengthy term and is removable only for cause. See 31 U.S.C. § 703 (2006).
432 See Susan E. Dudley, Observations on OIRA's Thirtieth Anniversary, 63 ADMIN. L. REV.
(SPECIAL EDITION) 113, 128 (2011).

433 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Putting Cost-Benefit Analysis in Its Place: Rethinking Regulatory Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335, 353-54 (2o1).
434 See Stephenson, supra note 63, at 1457-58.
435 See Posner, supra note 20, at I154-63 (analyzing incentives for agents to produce CBAs under conditions of full and incomplete information); Stephenson, supra note 63, at 1438-61 (summarizing research incentives for agents under various monitoring scenarios). Whether such stra-
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tions of the information produced could help to provide the necessary
counterweight to such dynamics.
The prospective dynamics of agency self-insulation also highlight a
number of avenues through which Congress could more effectively insulate agencies from the President beyond the formal removal restrictions
at issue in Free Enterprise Fund, and in recognition of the more functional nature of agency independence. 4 3 6 Recall that, ever since President Reagan's Executive Order 12,291, presidential review covers any
"agency" as defined by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980431 (PRA)
and expressly excludes those defined as "independent regulatory agencies" under that Act.43 8 Since 1981, Congress has thus had the ability
to circumscribe the coverage of presidential review through statutory
amendments to the PRA.43" Recent provisions contained in the DoddFrank Act 4 4 0 - placing the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the PRA's list of
"independent regulatory agencies" - reflect this strategy. 44 1
In addition, Congress could dictate specific policymaking forms
that are more likely, as a class, to bypass presidential review; for example, prohibiting rulemaking would channel policymaking to other
forms such as guidance documents. 442 Congress could also use statutory deadlines to help empower executive agencies against the President,

tegically produced information produces rational or socially optimal results is a separate question
not addressed here; all that is important for present purposes is that the principal has some ideal
point, however arrived at, and requires information about whether regulatory action will achieve
that result.
436 See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3169 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting). For discussion of the case, see supra pp. 1762-63.
437 Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 20, 30, 42,
and 44 U.S.C.).
438 See Exec. Order No. 12,291 § i(d), 3 C.F.R. 127, 128 (1982) (revoked 1993) (defining an
"agency" as per 44 U.S.C. § 3502(1) and excluding those agencies specified in 44 U.S.C.
§ 3502(lo)); Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3 (b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994) (same), reprintedas amended
in 5 U.S.C. § 6o app. at 86-91 (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011). Note that the Paperwork Reduction Act
excludes from the definition of "agency" the GAO and the Federal Election Commission. 44
U.S.C. § 3502(l) (2006).
439 See Barkow, supra note 35, at 33 (noting that Congress can "list an agency among the independent regulatory agencies in the Paperwork Reduction Act to exempt it from OIRA review").
440 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7,
12, and 15 U.S.C.).
441 See Pub. L. No.

II1-203, § 315, 124 Stat. 1376, 1524 (2010) (inserting "Office of the Comptroller of the Currency" in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5)); id. § ilooD(a), 124 Stat. at 2111 (inserting, in the
same provision, "the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection" and "the Office of Financial
Research").
442 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § Ioz5b(i) (2oo6 & Supp. V 2011) ("The Secretary shall not promulgate
regulations with respect to this section."); Memorandum from Daniel T. Madzelan, Acting Assistant Sec'y for Postsecondary Educ., U.S. Dep't of Educ. (June 8, 2o1o), available at
http://ifap.ed.gov/dpcletters/GENioogFinalTextbookGuidance.html (interpreting that provision,
20 U.S.C. § 1o15b(i), through guidance document).
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or provide for overlapping agency jurisdictions or joint rulemakings
that would create and foster coalitions among agencies that together
could provide greater resistance to the President. 443 Finally, because
self-insulation is ultimately a resource-centered strategy, Congress's
budgeting decisions for OIRA, the Executive Office of the President,
and various other executive agencies would also help to determine the
relative bargaining power within the executive branch.
CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that the literature has given insufficient attention to the incentives created by presidential review relative to judicial review and has sought to help remedy that imbalance. The discussion has provided a conceptual framework and vocabulary for
thinking about strategic agency behavior in the context of presidential
review, illustrated its dynamics, and assessed its normative implications. The analysis yields multiple hypotheses for future empirical
work. Are there, for example, observable patterns of self-insulation
that differ for certain groups of agencies, such as those agencies with
costlier or more contentious rules? How do these patterns shift under
different political configurations, when different parties are in power,
or during periods of divided or unified government? Other potentially
fruitful research avenues include further attention to the President's
game-theoretic responses; the ways in which historical evolutions in
executive orders may reflect the self-insulation dynamic; and the similarities or differences between an agency's expectations regarding presidential review, on the one hand, and judicial review, on the other. It
is worth concluding by briefly reflecting upon a potential reason that
agency behavior under presidential review has not received sustained
attention until now. One explanation may be the tendency of courts
and scholars to frame the question of insulation narrowly as one of
agency institutional design. 444 They identify a host of institutional
"design features" such as personnel hiring requirements and location
outside the cabinet hierarchy as potential indicia of insulation from
presidential influence. 445 To shield agencies is to structure them the
right way.

443 Cf Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in Administrative Law,
2oo6 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 207-II; Jonathan R. Macey, OrganizationalDesign and Political Control
of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 104-08 (1992).

444 See, e.g., LEWIS, supra note 45, at 3 ("A study of agency design tells us something fundamental about who will create and implement public policy, about power and who will exercise it.").
445 See, e.g., id. at 45 ("Congress purposefully chooses to place new agencies outside of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) or cabinet as a way of shielding the agencies from presidential influence."); Barkow, supra note 35, at 45-49 (discussing hiring restrictions).
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By contrast, this Article has argued that while agency institutional
design choices can indeed help determine the degree of presidential
control, executive branch agencies too can engage in autonomous and
selective self-insulation from such influence even within these bounds.
The question of insulation, that is, can be both exogenous and endogenous: a function of rules as well as the resulting realities. Agencies
possess self-help tools, in a sense, through which to insulate their decisions. Future accounts of agency independence and insulation would
be remiss to ignore them.

